“We do not have a clearly articulated vision of the future of the state. ”, — write: www.pravda.com.ua
If the previous years can be characterized as a time of great (and often artificially inflated) expectations, then 2024 was full of anxiety and uncertainty. There is a lot of talk about war fatigue, but both it and the two previous phenomena are the brainchild of the same problem. We do not have a clearly articulated vision of the future of the state.
At the same time as the lack of understanding of where the state is headed, public anxiety is heightened by the fact that this year at the front looked like putting out permanent fires (and not always successfully). At the same time, in the rear there were attempts from time to time to organize nationwide banquets during the plague. For example, giving out “thousand” and “national cashback” when two-thirds of the budget is financed by partners, and the state is forced to increase taxes to a record.
As unfortunate as it may sound, we naturally found ourselves in this situation. The power of one, that is, the comprehensive power of the President in elected democracies, is rarely characterized by a strategic and planned approach to state management. For the most part, this is nothing more than wow-effect politics. And hardly anyone knows how to make bright shows better than yesterday’s professional showmen. But behind the scenes of these shows very often remain unsolved problems and lost opportunities.
Why do we talk about the lack of a strategic vision of the future in the authorities? Let’s consider it on the examples of landmark decisions of the state leadership in the past year.
What was 2024 remembered for? In fact, all popular decisions adopted by the parliament, the government or the President himself were submitted by the latter as his own initiative. This, again, is about the distribution of “thousands” and about “national cashback”. Although in general economic issues should be taken care of by the prime minister.
The most significant decision this year was the adoption of the law on mobilization. At the same time, the President pretended that the state’s need for mobilization is a matter for the military. And the latter were “deceived” by promising to be dismissed from service after 36 months and removing the norm on the day of voting for the law as a whole.
By the way, the need to adopt separate resolutions on improving reservation, recruiting, and transfer of servicemen once again indicates how much was not taken into account in the document. And it once again emphasizes the low quality of law-making and the reluctance of anyone to take responsibility for unpopular decisions.
NSDC as an instrument of the President’s intervention in the executive power This year, the President’s intervention in the work of the government gained an unprecedented scale. And the most obvious tool for this was the demonstration meetings of the National Security and Defense Council. Thus, at the beginning of the year, the National Security Council recommended to the President to form a Council on support of entrepreneurship under martial law. And also – instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to prepare draft laws that should reduce pressure on business.
And by the end of the year, the President, with the help of the NSDC, decided to reform the medical and social expert commission (MSEK). At first glance, initiatives are needed, if not for a few “buts”. First of all, according to the Constitution, the NSDC is a coordinating body in the field of security and defense. Therefore, its influence should not extend to economic policy or, even more so, to the reform of MSEK.
Intervening in extraneous spheres with the help of the National Security Council is not a new practice for Ukrainian presidents. Thus, Viktor Yushchenko was looking for ways out of the economic crisis at the NSDC meetings or was solving problems at the state-owned enterprise “Ukraine Printing Plant”. Viktor Yanukovych was tasked with providing the population with high-quality and affordable medicines. And President Poroshenko was solving problems related to Privatbank.
Shmyhal’s government or Zelenskyi’s Cabinet? The process of replacing part of the government, which took place in September, left a depressing impression. First of all, the prime minister did not actually comment on the process of selecting new candidates. And what is even worse – it did not surprise anyone at all. Then the parliamentary majority obediently voted for the new ministers. And the parliamentary opposition could not (or did not want to) demonstrate what parliamentary control can and should look like.
On the one hand, it is already clear to everyone that candidates for the positions of ministers were selected and approved in the Office of the President. On the other hand, parliamentarians had the opportunity to take responsibility for the country and start doing their work. But, unfortunately, they chose to remain extras and continue to complain about Bankova.
Closed circle of managerial schizophrenia If we look back at the history of the last 30 years, it seems that we are, in a certain sense, walking in circles. Presidents influence the executive branch, even though they are not supposed to do so according to the Constitution. Heads of State Administrations, instead of implementing government programs, carry out the President’s instructions. And the parliament is not a subject.
Sometimes they create an attractive illusion for us, saying that it is necessary to change the procedure for appointing judges, prosecutors or police officers, to create another authority or to implement new principles of integrity, and then the state machine will work harmoniously and efficiently. However, experience shows that the real deep problem is precisely the imperfect system of power enshrined in the Constitution.
The mixed form of government, under which the President has actual influence on the executive power, leads to the fact that instead of a balanced system of checks and balances, we have a divided executive power, not under the control of anyone of the President and weak local power.
It’s time to admit: in order to have the ability to rebuild the state after the war, to integrate into the EU and NATO, and to face the constant threat of Russia, we have to change the system of government. We need such a state machine that will allow, on the one hand, to resist the enemy, and on the other hand, to ensure the safety and well-being of our citizens.
It is clear that we cannot change the Constitution during martial law, but we can and must talk about what the new system of government should be. This is a difficult topic, but without frank and detailed discussions we cannot move forward.
A new system of government for an efficient and democratic Ukraine We at the Center for Joint Actions have developed a model for changing the power system, which we are ready to discuss and improve. After all, effective democracy is in the interests of each of us.
First of all, we must admit: in Ukraine, the President does not belong to the executive power, but de jure the Constitution gives him broad powers in the sphere of security and defense, foreign policy and justice, which are components of the executive power. To put it simply, our presidents like to interfere in the work of the government, and sometimes even begin to conflict with the prime minister.
The cornerstone of any system of checks and balances is parliamentary control over the executive. But in fact, the parliament does not control that part of the executive power that depends on the President. In addition, the President has direct influence over the Security Service of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General, which gives him unlimited opportunities to put pressure on parliamentarians and businesses that finance political parties.
That is why we propose to deprive the President of his influence on the appointment of ministers of defense and foreign affairs. Candidates for the prime minister, all members of the government, and the Prosecutor General must be proposed by the parliamentary majority, and then they must be appointed by the People’s Deputies. At the same time, the Cabinet of Ministers will appoint higher military command, leadership of military formations, law enforcement agencies, security agencies and intelligence agencies after preliminary discussion of such candidates in the relevant committee and at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada. Political leadership of defense will be carried out by the Prime Minister.
The general management of foreign policy in our model will also be carried out by the government. And the President elected at the all-Ukrainian elections actually retains ceremonial functions in the field of international relations. In particular, in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it represents the state in official negotiations, concludes international treaties on behalf of the state, appoints ambassadors of Ukraine in agreement with the relevant parliamentary committee, receives ambassadors of foreign countries.
One of the existing problems also lies in the fact that the government cannot fully implement state policies, since local executive bodies are actually subordinate to the President. After all, it is he who appoints their leaders. Therefore, we propose to deprive the President of his influence on the appointment of heads of local executive bodies and to transfer these powers to the Cabinet of Ministers, as well as to give the heads of local state administrations the status of civil servants.
Parliament is the head of everything There is a critical need to strengthen parliamentary control. In particular, this concerns the sphere of security and defense. The parliamentary opposition lacks effective mechanisms to control the government, and the committees of the Verkhovna Rada do not have sufficient powers to exercise oversight. In most cases, decisions are made behind the scenes, without proper discussion and transparency.
Parliament is further weakened by the fact that the grounds for its dissolution are unclear. As a result, the President can abuse them to his advantage. We propose to guarantee in the Constitution mechanisms of control over the work of the government to the parliamentary opposition, as well as to give committees independent powers to control the work of the Cabinet of Ministers and individual ministries. And to strengthen parliamentary control in the security and defense sector, create the institute of the military ombudsman of the Verkhovna Rada.
And so that the President cannot abuse the possibility of dissolving the parliament, it is necessary to define clear grounds for early termination of the powers of the Verkhovna Rada:
- within 2 months from the moment of the first meeting of the new convocation of the parliament or within 2 months after the resignation of the government, the personal composition of the government has not been formed and approved;
- within 2 months, the Verkhovna Rada does not make any decision.
Another important aspect is that the Constitution does not define the grounds for the formation of separate specialized law enforcement agencies and state regulators. Thus, the National Commission for State Regulation in the Field of Communication and Informatization, the National Commission for Securities and the Stock Market, the State Bank of Ukraine and the NABU are by their nature executive bodies, but their legal status is not clearly defined.
Therefore, it is worth defining in the Constitution specialized law enforcement bodies and state regulators as bodies of executive power, as well as establishing their independence by:
- determination of an open and independent selection procedure for members and heads of these bodies, as well as clear grounds for their dismissal;
- inability to influence their work;
- adequate funding of their work.
In the end, we come to the conclusion that the existing administrative-territorial system is outdated and does not meet the needs of today, because the Soviet authorities formed it for their own needs. Equally important is the fact that the autonomy of Crimea was created as a result of Russia’s destructive influence in the early 1990s.
What does this mean in practice? For example, the regional level of management often duplicates the functions of the districts, which creates unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles. Without modernization of the administrative and territorial system, decentralization – the most successful of reforms – will not be complete. Therefore, we propose to introduce a two-level system – without a regional level – and to deprive Crimea of its autonomy status.
Why is it worth talking about? In order to successfully confront Russia during the war and the period of post-war reconstruction, the state of Ukraine must become effective and capable. European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which will become a safe, economic and systemic guarantor of a stable and strong democracy in contrast to Russia, will be possible only if independent and democratic public institutions work smoothly. This will not only ensure the economic well-being of citizens, but will also allow putting safeguards against a slide into authoritarianism and populism.
And in order to achieve all this, it is necessary to discuss changes to the Constitution, to think through a system of checks and balances, to work out projects for changes now.
Oksana Zabolotna