“If not Zelensky”: virtual “seemtology” and political reality

He read with great surprise Pavel Kazarin’s article “If not Zelensky.”

In this text, Paul draws false dilemma, and then tries to draw some correct conclusion from these false diles.

But this is absolutely useless.

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The first and main fault of Paul is that he constantly argues with some imaginary “supporters of the fifth president” (well, though, without the word “powder”), whose position depicts in a very bizarre form.

These fifth presidential supporters say that Putin was not attacked by Poroshenko’s cadences, because the Ukrainian army and the political will of the fifth president were “the obstacle to the invasion.”

Paul reasonably replies to this strange thesis that “the Kremlin has never been perceived by the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian state as a full rival.”

In addition, the same “supporters of the fifth president” Obumanto “are convinced that the victory of” hawk “in the 2019 elections could protect our country from the war.” “But”, says Paul, “probably different: such a scenario could deprive the Kremlin of illusions even earlier.”

But with whom does Paul argue with? With a scarecrow (Straw man) of own production?

Paul’s second is that in his “anti -protest” considerations, he seems to take into account both the military and the political aspects of confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, but not surprisingly does not take into account the combination of these aspects. Therefore, it turns out that the hypothetical scenario of Poroshenko’s second cadence is a “victory of hawks” that would challenge Putin even faster and more radical than Zelensky did. But really?!

I have to remind Paul and all the readers of his strange text a few elementary facts.

During the Putin’s Castenance, the Ukrainian army, but a combination of army and diplomacy, was restrained by Putin. Paul correctly writes: “The second Minsk agreements have inspired the illusion to Moscow that it will be able to sell Kiev for voluntary rejection of sovereignty.” But for some reason, Paul forgets to put on the fifth president a well -conscious creation of this illusion (yes, the illusions!) In parallel with the intensification, step by step, the Ukrainian army.

“If” Poroshenko’s second cadence became a reality, there is no reason to doubt that the strategy of the Ukrainian authorities would be the same as in the previous 5 years: the army to strengthen, and the Russian “5 column” in Ukraine in Ukraine, but to allow it to be so much that Putin, in the aggregate of all circumstances, was inclined to continue to continue.

Again, as Paul rightly writes, “the Kremlin laid the Great War not because of Ukrainian force. He could postpone it through Ukrainian compromises.” But Paul for some reason avoids not only the statement that these compromises were for the fifth president, quite conscious tactics of evasion, but also quite obvious assumption that, under the hypothetical second cadence of Poroshenko, such compromises would continue in the future. And Poroshenko’s political opponents, in this scenario, would also be guilty of contact with Medvedchuk, conveniently closing his eyes to the fact that these contacts were one of the significant factors in preventing full -scale Russian aggression.

In reality, this compromise strategy was hindered … Ukrainian society, which was a large majority against President Poroshenko, albeit for diametrically opposite reasons: after all, for some members of this situational association, he was inferior to Putin, and for others, on the contrary, too much. Therefore, it can be acknowledged that Poroshenko’s “compromise” strategy has actually failed, but not with Putin, but with most Ukrainians.

However, if you imagine that Ukrainian society would support the continuation of this strategy in 2019; Would she work until 2024, would she turn away the Great War? No one has the answer to these questions. May not. But it is not necessary for the fact that the hypothetical friend of Poroshenko’s cadence would become a “victory of hawks” who would impose sanctions against Medvedchuk even faster than Zelensky, relying in the confrontation of Putin solely on the Armed Forces.

In fact, Poroshenko tried to combine the policy of “hawk” (when it was about the army) with the policy of “dove” (when it was about diplomacy). Instead, Zelensky first behaved in both respects as a “dove”, and then, under the pressure of circumstances, was forced to behave in both respects as “hawk”.

And finally. The trouble of Zelensky – and with him and all Ukraine – was not that he challenged Putin, introducing, for the joy of Ukrainian patriots, sanctions against Medvedchuk.

Zelensky’s trouble was that he played great politics, not understanding the consequences of his own actions (and here I can say for sure: unlike his predecessor!).

Zelensky pulled Putin into Paris, going to the meeting that he agreed to all his demands, just to finally “look Putin in his eyes” and fairly, “Patsan”, to rush everything-and did not even understand how much Putin was blown up by Putin. Visa).

And when Putin increased the pressure on Zelensky through Medvedchuk’s media imperia, Zelensky simply crushed this media imperia, again not realizing that he was removing almost the last fuse that restrained Putin from a full-scale invasion.

And no, I do not say that Medvedchuk in Ukrainian politics had to endure for life. I just state the fact that the real choice of both of these Ukrainian presidents – the fifth and sixth – was between the “compromise policy” and the Great War.

Poroshenko deliberately elected the first and demonstrated his inherent snooze of diplomatic maneuvers. Zelensky from the first, after Paris, quickly refused (in fact, he did not have this shaky), but he did not even realize that it was this step that he had irreversibly chose the second (if he understood, at least in 2021 he would prepare – and prepared the country – for a great war much more than it was).

As a result, the sixth president, who came to power with a claim to agree, finally, with Putin better than his predecessor did it, with his political naivety achieved the exact opposite result. And despite his own intentions, he became not “President of Peace”, but “President of the War”. Only now is full -scale.

This is the irony of history.

PS for those who read inattentively, I will emphasize: I do not say that in the case of a hypothetical “Second Cadence of Poroshenko,” Ukraine “would be better.” Or “would not be better.” As I do not say that “the best”, on the contrary, is what has happened to us all in the last three years. Now these divisions in the coffee thicket no longer make sense, because, as another Ukrainian president said, “we have what we have.”

So our task is to squeeze out of the current situation, the maximum of the advantages, especially since these “pros” paid for incredibly expensive, tragedy The price. And the task of “with an asterisk” is to finally stop the controversy with the imaginary “fifths of the fifth president”, in which these imaginary “supporters” imaginally defend the imaginary fool that their opponents are easy and pleasant to refute.

Alexei Panich

Source: Facebook

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