“Europe promises support to Ukraine, but avoids decisive action against Russia. Will this change in the event of a NATO threat?”, — write: www.pravda.com.ua
We talked about Ukraine, Georgia, whether the West should help at all. The discussion was heated, but one phrase came up again and again: “I would not send my son to die for Ukraine.”
And you know what? I agree. I wouldn’t send it either. The instinct of self-preservation is completely natural, and no one wants his child to be sent to some frozen trench to bleed for a country he has never been to. It’s not cowardice, it’s just parental instinct.
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But this is where the difficulties begin. The same Europe, which is not ready to send its sons to die for Ukraine, has been convincing Ukrainians for years that the West will cover them.
They promoted democratic revolutions, applauded from the stands and made speeches about European values. And when Russia invaded, it turned out that “support” meant keeping Ukraine on artificial respiration, not arming it for victory.
The pattern is constant: give just enough to prevent collapse, but never enough to win. Georgians also learned it. In 2024, tens of thousands filled the streets of Tbilisi, waving EU flags. The authorities responded with a crackdown, the police broke skulls. The reaction of the West was reduced to statements and bans on entry, which, I am sure, made an unforgettable impression on the riot police.
One follower noted: If NATO is indeed attacked, then they will respond. I asked him what exactly was considered an attack, because NATO territory had already been hit.
In November 2022, a rocket fell on Poland and killed two people. In response, Poland invoked Article 4 – consultation, which allows the issue to be “discussed” and essentially boils down to an appointed meeting. Two civilians were killed by a rocket attack during active fighting near the border, and the response was the assembly.
In September 2025, Poland recorded 19 drone incursions in one night. Prime Minister Tusk called it a “large-scale provocation,” but cautiously added that “there is no reason to claim that we are at war.” Nineteen drones, but this is not a conflict. So where is the threshold? Is the threshold simply something that allows you to not act further?
Europe could act without soldiers. Russia has a “shadow fleet” of tankers that transport oil to circumvent sanctions and finance the war. 60% of the sea export of Russian oil passes through the Baltic and the Danish Straits – directly through European waters. Europe could block these vessels tomorrow, but is not doing so because of “deep concern about a possible reaction from Russia”.
Meanwhile, the US and France detained the tankers, and Russia’s response was reduced to diplomatic protests without any substance. When the US boarded the Marinera in January 2026, Putin remained silent, and the Foreign Ministry complained about piracy.
Russia does not escalate when it is pushed back, but Europe does not push back because Russia can escalate. A closed circle.
There is also energy. In the third year of the invasion, the EU paid Russia more for fuel than it gave Ukraine in aid. In 2024, imports of Russian LNG (liquefied natural gas – ed.) reached a record level – in the middle of a war that Europe is allegedly fighting against.
There is a cyber war, which Europe has barely touched. There are sanctions that could be applied and not circumvented. The toolkit exists, there is no will to use it.
This leads to the most dangerous fallacy I have come across: that Russia will never attack NATO. Look at the countries that Russia took over or subjugated after World War II: Finland, the Baltic states, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine since 2014. This is not a country that respects borders when it senses slack.
German intelligence warns that Russia may be ready for a large-scale war by 2030. Baltic officials assess readiness for a limited operation 2-3 years after Ukraine. A RAND war game showed that Russia could capture Tallinn in 60 hours.
But then will Article 5 work? Here’s what it says: each state must take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” There is no automatic commitment, no requirement to send troops. A country may decide that “necessary action” is sanctions or expressions of concern.
With Russian bombs leveling a hospital in Tallinn and Estonian children lying dead under the rubble, who seriously believes that Lisbon will feel the need to act? That the Portuguese Parliament will decide that their sons must die for a country that most voters cannot find on a map? “Actions he deems necessary” is the functional equivalent of nothing when the country has no interest in the outcome.
Let’s recall the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, where the USA, Great Britain and Russia guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal. Ukraine fulfilled its obligations, the guarantors did not. I see no reason to believe that Article 5 will work otherwise, because both documents have the same nature: they are wishes dressed in the language of obligations, which are worth exactly what the signatories are willing to pay.
Why would a German die for an Estonian? This is not an insult, but a strategic issue. If Russia bites off a piece of Estonia tomorrow, what will oblige Berlin to send soldiers? Discretionary response contract? European solidarity, which could not even agree on the termination of gas purchases? The real deterrent has always been American bases, and Russian strategists have openly said that they fear not NATO, but the American presence.
I would not send my son to die for Ukraine. But realize what you are saving by making such a choice. A Europe that has encouraged democratic movements but is not ready to defend them. Which finances the aggressor for billions every year. Which responds to missiles with consultations. A convenient illusion that if not provoked, the problem will remain far away. History says otherwise.
Russia does not stop when it is not repelled; she stops when they give. When the US detained the tankers, Russia protested, but did nothing. When Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet, Russia threatened, but backed down.
The question is not whether you will send your son to die for Ukraine. The question is whether you will send him to die for Estonia, Latvia or Poland, because that question is coming. So far, Europe’s answer is that it would prefer to appoint a consultation.
Alexander LevyUSA
A column is a type of material that reflects exclusively the point of view of the author. It does not claim objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic in question. The point of view of the editors of “Economic Pravda” and “Ukrainian Pravda” may not coincide with the author’s point of view. The editors are not responsible for the reliability and interpretation of the given information and perform exclusively the role of a carrier.
