Fortification failure in Dnipropetrovsk region: the threat of a Russian breakthrough

Against the background of a serious escalation of hostilities and the intensification of offensive operations of the Russian Federation on the eastern front, especially on Pokrovsky direction the strategic attention of society is once again focused on Ukraine’s ability to provide deep and sustainable defense. The rapid advance of the enemy reveals not only the tactical advantages of the aggressor, but also critical gaps in the strategic engineering of Ukrainian territories. Most of all, this is visible in the example of the Russian advance in Dnipropetrovsk region, a key region that provides operational depth for the southern and eastern theaters of war.

The recent public one was also resonant statement deputy Maryana Bezuglai that Russian troops are breaking through in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, deliberately bypassing the main defense lines through the southern regions of the Dnipropetrovsk region. According to her statement, this region was strategically unprotected, turning into a “kill zone without nets, fortifications and units.”

This political resonance, which indicates strategic unpreparedness, finds its direct documentary confirmation in the official appeal of the T0920 military unit to the head of DniproOVA, dated April 2024. In this letter, the military records not just individual delays, but systemic management collapse in the construction of platoon support points (VOP). It is the regional military administrations that are responsible for the construction and provision of materials for the critically important third line of defense. Thus, the document of the Ministry of Defense T0920 becomes indisputable proof that the declared political successes and the millions of hryvnias spent were not converted into a functional and sustainable defense infrastructure.

What is happening with fortifications – both in Dnipropetrovsk region and in Ukraine in general? Edition UA.News understood the problem.

Between documents and reality

UA.News received the appeal of the military unit T0920, which exposes a critical gap between administrative reporting and operational reality on the ground. The document details eight points of systemic problems that paralyzed the process of building fortifications in the Dnipropetrovsk region, assigned to units by order of the head of the OVA. These problems are systemic and cover absolutely all stages of work: from logistics and quality of materials to coordination and administrative interaction.

One of the most acute problems is inadequate logistics and chaotic supply. Soldiers of the Armed Forces directly indicate that suppliers and carriers do not follow the order, and due to the lack of clear information about the place of unloading, materials are either lost, or servicemen waste time on their “circulation around the area.” This logistical chaos is a direct result of poor coordination between civilian suppliers and military contractors unable to access simple but critical information. This leads to idle machinery and personnel, who instead of building, are forced to spend up to two hours a day just unloading materials.

The logistics problem is exacerbated by the lack of timely communication and managerial paralysis. Military unit T0920 notes that there is a lack of information about the supply of lumber to the station, and for the transportation of this material, it was necessary to additionally involve OVA forces. Paragraph 5 of the appeal is particularly alarming, which indicates a deep management crisis: the lack of response of Dnipropetrovsk OVA officials to the request for supplies. This is direct evidence that the administration, which is the customer and responsible for the provision, simply ignored the urgent needs of the military units, thereby deliberately disrupting the work schedule.

In addition, critical failures in operational discipline and planning were recorded. In paragraph 6 of the military’s appeal, it is noted that one of the suppliers arbitrarily, without the consent of the contractor, unloaded concrete structures for the VOP No. 6 in the city of Pokrovske, which is located 20 km from the construction site. Such an act of arbitrariness led to the need to urgently transfer equipment and suspend work in other areas, which only increases the already existing load. At the time of the application date — which is April 19, 2024 — incompleteness was recorded: the suppliers did not bring in the full amount of concrete structures for a number of construction sites, and for construction site No. 11, materials were not delivered at all.

The most threatening element that calls into question the strategic value of fortifications is the problem of the quality of materials. Military part T0920 documents the supply of defective concrete products for VOP #7 and #8, which needed urgent replacement. The problem was so critical that for temporary use, the soldiers had to smear the products with concrete mortar.

In fact, instead of a reliable fortification, the units received structures that could collapse during the first intensive shelling. The failure does not lie in the lack of funds or materials, but in the deep management chaos and lack of responsibility at the level of OVA.

Administrative Dissonance: Success Reports and Frontline Crisis

While the T0920 military unit in April 2024 recorded critical management and material problems, the public rhetoric of the Dnipropetrovsk OVA, headed by Serhiy Lysak, showed a completely opposite picture. The administration has repeatedly reported on significant successes, asserting that Dnipropetrovsk Region has fully completed the tasks of the military on the construction of fortifications and that the work is progressing on time according to the plan. As practice has shown, it was a complete lie.

The topic of financing occupied a special place in administrative reports. OVA emphasized that out of the allocated more than 370 million UAH, it was possible to “save” more than 70 million UAH, having mastered 297 million UAH. This economy was explained by the fact that the work was not performed by commercial contractors whose goal is profit, but by specialists of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the State Special Service of Transport. This approach was supposed to create the impression of transparency and efficient use of public funds.

However, if we compare this financial savings with the documents of the T0920, a significant contradiction arises. Rather than being a testament to efficiency, this saving was probably the result of the transfer of operational costs and risks to the military units themselves. The military were forced to solve logistical problems on their own, to finalize br reinforced concrete and compensate for the lack of basic materials (cement, sand). The question arises: is there not enough banal sand in Ukraine for the construction of fortifications? Or, perhaps, someone just completely sincerely “put” on their official duties?

Thus, formal financial savings were achieved at the cost of a critical reduction in quality, an increase in the load on the personnel of the Armed Forces (who, after all, are heroes defending the country, not free builders) — and, most importantly, at the cost of losing precious time for the preparation of defensive lines. It is interesting that in December 2024 Dnipropetrovsk region was visited by TSK VR, which positively evaluated the works, stating that the tasks were completed on time and all the facilities were built.

Strategic consequences of unpreparedness of defense lines

According to the defined role, the third line of defense, the construction of which is entrusted to the OVA, should provide operational depth, be capital in nature (using concrete structures) and be ready for the circular defense of key cities. Dnipropetrovsk region, as a rear bridgehead for the front in Donetsk region and Zaporizhzhia, is of absolutely critical importance. Failures in its fortifications pose a direct strategic threat, and corruption on this topic under martial law can generally be considered not just as illegal enrichment or criminal negligence, but as direct treason.

If platoon support points, which are key elements of defense, are unable to withstand artillery or aviation fire due to structural defects, then they, it turns out, cannot perform the function of protecting personnel and maintaining borders. Such unpreparedness turns the line of defense into a “Potemkin village”, which sharply increases the risk of the enemy’s rapid advance deep into the territory of the region – as MP Bezugla warned about. The actual advance of Russian forces in the areas bordering Dnipropetrovsk region emphasizes the relevance of this threat.

“The Russian Federation is breaking through in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, bypassing the entire defense line of the south through the Dnipropetrovsk region, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine were distracted to Pokrovsk. I comment that it is so: nothing was prepared for the south in Dnipropetrovsk region, and the head of the OVA Lysak, who, taking into account the problems in the military administration, also defied common sense, was quickly transferred to Odesa. To hide? Whose idea, how to explain? In the Dnipropetrovsk OVA, no one can now make decisions at all — an additional paralysis, which is added to the disorder in the military and the manipulations of Head Comman Syrskyi.” Bezugla wrote in her Telegram.

The situation in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is part of a large national problem related to the transfer of responsibility for the third line to civil administrations. Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk OVA — they all demonstrate critical management negligence. This confirms that the main defect in the system of defense construction is the prioritization of financial and political reports over the quality of completed works. The result is a lack of sustainable defensive depth, which is absolutely unacceptable in the context of a full-scale war that has been going on for almost four years.

Opinions of experts

Military expert Oleg Zhdanov acknowledges the problem. At the same time, he believes that it is not only about a specific case with fortifications, but about the general failure of the country’s defense.

“The problem is not so much with fortifications. It is an integral part of the country’s general defense. There are huge problems in the organization, in the inconsistency of the allocated amounts, and so on. It goes without saying. But our main problem is the military leadership, the general staff and the commander. Please tell me: is there a plan for the defense of the country? There is no such plan. Is there a transfer of the economy to military rails? Is there a general plan for building fortifications? The commander should not manually move companies and battalions on the map. He should build a general strategy. Now everyone is saving Pokrovsk, and the Russians are already advancing on Zaporozhye and Dnipropetrovsk region. Where is the strategy? The fish is rotting from the head. Where is the fortification plan? It doesn’t need to be announced, of course, it’s secret stuff. But there must be a plan. And if even the military says that there are no plans, that they live one day at a time – well, that’s the way to defeat.” – says Oleg Zhdanov.

And here is a soldier of the Armed Forces, the commander of the intelligence unit of the GUR Denys Yaroslavskyi evaluates the situation more positively, although he recognizes the existence of certain problems.

“The problem with fortifications really exists. After last year’s story with fortifications during a breakthrough in Vovchansk, which is in Kharkiv Oblast, active construction has begun in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. I paid attention to it even then. Today, we have both the second and third lines. I can’t say for sure about her condition, I haven’t checked. But fortifications are being built, they are there. There are boundaries in case of planned departure from positions. I do not see such an environment as in the same Pokrovsk, today in the Dnipropetrovsk region. There is an advance of the enemy, indeed, but there is no critical situation. The main thing today is to prevent logistical routes from being cut. This is Russia’s key priority: to cut our logistics.” — noted Denys Yaroslavskyi.

Summing up, today Ukraine already has a deep management crisis in the process of building strategic fortifications on the southeastern flanks of the state. Political decisions, such as the transfer of OVA heads to other regions, cannot replace a transparent investigation and prosecution of officials whose negligence, incompetence or simply banal stupidity led to the creation of a strategic threat to the security of Ukraine. The urgent need to strengthen the defense capability requires the immediate correction of systemic errors documented by the military — to which the OVA did not even manage to respond to an official appeal in 1.5 years.