A year of record Russian attacks and losses. The main events that determined 2024 for Ukraine – NV timeline

The Russian military and special services began to develop a detailed plan for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the summer of 2021: the order was given by Vladimir Putin personally. However, the head of the Kremlin defined only general intentions, and they were already detailed by a very small group of people.

For example, the deputy chiefs of departments of the General Staff of the Russian Federation learned about the intention of a full-scale invasion and occupation of Ukraine a few days before February 24, and the leadership of most tactical military units – in a few hours. Putin did not trust even his inner circle. For example, he informed Minister of Foreign Affairs Serhiy Lavrov about the attack on Ukraine only in the early hours of February 24.

The invasion plan was developed by a limited group of people from Putin’s administration, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, along with several close subordinates, and the leadership of the FSB’s Operational Information and International Relations Service, the so-called 5th service. The latter was headed by Colonel-General Serhii Byeseda in 2009. Read more ↓

During preparation, they relied on sociological research, the results of which indicated that Ukrainian society is mostly politically apathetic, does not trust its own leaders, is primarily concerned with economic problems, and does not believe in the possible escalation of the war with the Russian Federation. At the same time, Gerasimov insisted that after more than 10 years of modernization, the armed forces of the Russian Federation had reached conditional parity with the United States, and he called the Russian army the second most powerful in the world.

Ultimately, the authors reduced the concept of a full-scale invasion to a quick strike in several directions, the elimination of the country’s leadership and leaders of possible resistance, the capture of financial and energy sector institutions, which would ensure effective control over the majority of the Ukrainian population.

According to the plan, the invasion was to begin with massive missile and air strikes on Ukrainian air defense facilities, military command and control infrastructure, airfields, and ammunition depots. At the same time, critical infrastructure facilities, such as power plants and railways, had to remain intact, as they were considered fundamentally important for the further occupation of the country. The airborne assault troops of the Russian Federation were supposed to capture power plants, airfields, water supply facilities, as well as the buildings of the National Bank and the Verkhovna Rada, etc. The elimination of the political leadership and possible leaders of the resistance was entrusted to the Russian special services.

For the implementation of the political component of the plan, the quick capture of Kyiv was fundamentally important, and the military one was the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the Donbass in the zone of operation of the Joint Forces (JOF). The forces of the Southern Military District of the Russian Army (tactical symbol Z in the square) from Crimea were supposed to seize territories along the coast of the Black and Azov Seas, as well as establish control over the North Crimean Canal, which supplies water to the occupied peninsula, Zaporizhzhia and South Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPP).

The troops of the Western Military District (tactical symbol Z), advancing from the direction of Belgorod, Kursk, and Voronezh, were supposed to cut off the Ukrainian forces in Donbas along the line Lozova — Gulyaipole or Barvinkovo ​​— Velyka Novosilka. At the same time, the offensive of troops mobilized from the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions would limit the mobility of the Ukrainian military along the entire contact line in the OOS zone. With such maneuvers, the General Staff of the Russian Federation expected to surround up to 50% of all the forces of the Armed Forces available at that time.

The most combat-ready and modernized units of the Russian army, which were controlled from the command post of the Eastern Military District, were supposed to advance from the territory of the Gomel region of Belarus. This group, which received the tactical sign V, played an almost decisive role in the capture of Kyiv. The troops from the so-called Gomel direction were supposed to advance along the right bank of the Dnieper, capture the decommissioned Chornobyl NPP, cut an important transport artery — highway M06 (Kyiv — Chop) — and move in the direction of the large Fastiv railway hub. Advanced Russian units in this direction were to capture the airport in Gostomel on the outskirts of Kyiv and organize an “air bridge” for permanent reinforcements.

At the same time, another group (tactical sign O) was supposed to enter from the territory of the Bryansk region of the Russian Federation, whose troops were supposed to block the capital from the Brovary side. After all, the capital would be blocked from the left bank of the Dnieper by defense brigade units, and from the opposite side by the elite forces of the Russian army.

Forces V and O, in contrast to other directions, were assigned sectors and tasks up to the level of a battalion tactical group. For example, for mechanized units, the goal was often to quickly occupy and then isolate and cover key objects. On the axis from Gomel to Kyiv, the forces were divided into blocking units, which were to occupy positions facing west to cut off Kyiv from the western regions of the country, and responsible for advancing into the city. The latter found out about the invasion earlier than other Russian military, equal in rank: at least a day. Read more ↓

The authors of the general plan for the capture of Ukraine emphasized speed and predicted that 10 days after the invasion, that is, by March 6, the Armed Forces of Ukraine would stop organized resistance, representatives of the Ukrainian authorities would flee, be killed or captured, and Russian forces would proceed to stabilization operations. Read more ↓

Map of Ukraine of the 1960s, used by the Russian military in the Kyiv region. She was found after the occupiers fled (The New York Times)

After March 6, the role of the Russian armed forces was to be reduced to assisting the special services of the Russian Federation, which would be engaged in the creation of occupation “administrations” in the captured territories, as well as the Russian Guard. The latter was responsible for suppressing possible mass riots. Read more ↓

The special services — the FSB and the GRU — even developed a system for assessing the loyalty of the population of the occupied territories: those subject to physical liquidation; those that require suppression and intimidation; those who are considered neutral and inclined to cooperate; and are also ready to cooperate. Read more ↓

Such a categorization, according to the plan’s authors, was necessary for effective filtering measures in the extensive system of camps in order to prevent further resistance by Ukrainians. A population disloyal to the occupiers, depending on the assessment, was needed shields, imprison, deport to the depths of Russia, or put under surveillance for the destruction of possible resistance networks. Read more ↓

In order to fully seize power in Ukraine, the Kremlin was going to create a pro-Russian faction in the Verkhovna Rada, which would outlaw any resistance to the Russian Federation. Regions that continued to resist the occupiers would be cut off from electricity, water supply and funding from the National Bank. Read more ↓

So, the Kremlin expected to establish full control over Ukraine by the summer of 2022. Read more ↓