“According to the analysts of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Russian invaders have recently been advancing much faster than in the whole of 2023, and are not abandoning their intentions to capture the entire Donetsk region. Source: ISW Verbatim: “The recent confirmed victories of Russian troops at Vugledar and Velika Novosilka indicate that the war in Ukraine has not reached a dead end.”, — write: www.pravda.com.ua
According to the analysts of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Russian invaders have recently been advancing much faster than in the whole of 2023, and are not abandoning their intentions to capture the entire Donetsk region.
Source: ISW
Literally: “The recent confirmed victories of Russian troops near Vugledar and Velika Novosilka indicate that the war in Ukraine has not reached a stalemate. The front line in the Donetsk region is becoming more and more volatile, as Russian troops have recently been advancing much faster than in all of 2023 “.
Details: Analysts indicate that the advance of Russian troops in the southeast of Ukraine is largely the result of the identification and tactical use of vulnerable places in the Ukrainian front line.
Since the fall of 2024, Russian troops have been making gradual tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine. Russian forces have not been able to regain the operational maneuver seen in the first months of a full-scale Russian invasion, and the current Russian tactical advance, while faster than the months of positional warfare that characterized most of 2023 and early 2024, is still well behind the pace. promotion in March 2022.
Russian forces managed to take advantage of the capture of Vugledar for further offensive operations in the west of Donetsk region, contrary to an erroneous preliminary assessment by ISW, which predicted the opposite.
ISW suggests the following options for action that the Russian command may consider in light of the recent advance of Russian forces.
The advance of Russian troops in the direction of Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo, Vugledar and Velika Novosilka gives the Russian military command several options for actions that it can try to implement in the coming weeks and months.
It appears that the Russian military command is simultaneously trying to encircle Velika Novosilka while simultaneously closing pockets with Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhovo. Russian troops are also conducting auxiliary operations with the aim of improving the geometry of the battlefield in the south of Donetsk region and reducing threats to the flanks of Russian troops.
ISW presents the following COAs on the battlefield in random order, as each is not mutually exclusive.
COA 1: Russian forces advance to the southwest, east, and northeast of Velika Novosilka with the objective of flanking the settlement, bypassing the area immediately south of Velika Novosilka.
COA 2: Russian forces are advancing towards Andriivka (along H15 and west of Kurakhovo) from the south in support of Russian efforts to close Ukrainian “pockets” near Kurakhovo and align the front line.
COA 3: Russian forces advance west and southwest of Selidovoy along the Pustinka-Sonstsivka line toward Andriyivka to defeat the Ukrainian cell north of Kurakhovo and threaten Ukrainian escape routes.
Literally: “It remains unclear which of these targets the Russian command will pursue, and whether it will pursue at all.”
Details: Experts note that the priority task of the Russian command in the Donetsk region until the end of 2024 was the capture of Pokrovsk – a goal that the Russian command temporarily abandoned after stiff Ukrainian resistance on the outskirts of Pokrovsk.
It is not clear to what extent the Russian command has prepared to use the opportunities on this part of the front, and what resistance the Ukrainian troops will offer to the advance of Russian forces.
Literally: “Ukraine noticeably blunted Russian offensive operations near Chasov Yar and Pokrovsk in 2024.”
Details: The report suggests that the Russian military command is likely planning how to advance into the southeastern part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in support of Russia’s long-standing goal of capturing all of Donetsk Oblast.
The Kremlin’s goal of capturing the entire Donetsk region most likely involves ground operations in the south and east of Dnipropetrovsk region with the aim of blocking Ukrainian land lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk region, and encircling these Ukrainian positions.
Literally: “Russia’s potential efforts aimed at achieving the Kremlin’s goal of capturing the entire Donetsk region by occupying at least part of the Dnipropetrovsk region are consistent with Russia’s desire for the complete surrender of Ukraine and the destruction of its independence and territorial sovereignty.”
“The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have not yet been able to resume operational maneuver on the battlefield and instead are still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defense line for a gradual tactical advance.”
ISW Key Findings for 24 November:
- The recent confirmed victories of Russian troops near Vugledar and Velika Novosilka show that the war in Ukraine has not reached a dead end. The front line in the Donetsk region is becoming increasingly volatile, as Russian troops have recently been advancing much faster than in the whole of 2023.
- The advance of Russian troops in the Pokrovsky, Kurakhivskyi, Vugledarskyi, and Velikonovosilkivsky directions presents the Russian military command with several options of actions that it can try to implement in the coming weeks and months.
- The Russian military command is probably planning how to advance into the southeastern part of the Dnipropetrovsk region in support of Russia’s long-standing goal of capturing the entire Donetsk region.
- Parts of Russia’s Central, Eastern, and Southern Military Districts are conducting simultaneous, complementary offensive operations in the Donetsk region and have recently achieved relatively rapid tactical advancement. Russia’s military command may be learning from some battlefield mistakes after three years of war, but the extent of that learning is currently unclear.
- The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have not yet been able to resume operational maneuver on the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defense line for a gradual tactical advance.
- On the night of November 23-24, Ukrainian troops attacked the radar of the Russian S-400 air defense system in the Kursk region.
- According to reports, Russia has recruited hundreds of Grom adyan to Yemen to serve in the Russian army amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran and the Iran-backed Houthi movement.
- Ukrainian and Russian troops have recently advanced on the main Ukrainian section of the front in the Kursk region.
- Russian troops advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Vugledar, and Velika Novosilka, while Ukrainian troops advanced on the main Ukrainian section of the front in the Kursk region.