“Right now, world leaders are actively discussing a potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the eve of the meeting of the Presidents of the United States and Russia in Alaska. The other day, Donald Trump announced a “certain territorial exchange”, which should be expected during the conclusion of the agreement.”, – WRITE: www.pravda.com.ua
Political bidding during any negotiations about peace or truce is not news. However, legal considerations and restrictions are also available for each political bidding. What are these limits of acceptable and unacceptable in a potential peace agreement under international law? I propose to consider it in two parts: requirements for territorial concessions and future reparations and Ukrainian justice for international crimes. In the context of territories, or international law will accept territorial concessions in a potential peace agreement, even if Ukraine under political pressure has put its signature under it? What will be the fate of the occupied territories if the peace agreement changed their status?
From the winner to the Paria If the events we are witnesses were happening 150 years ago, Russia would have legally had any problems. The face of international law looked different than we know it today – than everything we used to be and began to perceive for a proper and familiar routine. What adequate person will, in the end, will deny that the aggressive war aimed at seizing other people’s territories and subjugating their population is a barbaric prohibited act?
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The old rule of law acknowledged the war by an integral right of every state. International law has not only established the right to initiate a war on any occasion (for example, to conquer resources or repay debts), but also enshrined the “right of strong”, where all the achievements of the war remained behind the winner. The state that seized the territory had an indispensable right to join such territory, to assign its property and to dispose of its population. Other states, accordingly, had to recognize such a title. The refusal to do this was the danger of becoming the next victim of the war.
The two world wars, as well as the Briana-Kallog Pact on the ban on war as a means of national policy, signed by a group of 15 states in 1928 and eventually widely supported by the international community, changed the face of international law dramatically. In fact, their consequences turned the key principles of the old law and order up. The war became forbidden. “Right of strong” disappeared. The aggressor state cannot claim the fruits of its conquests. Even if it controls the captured territory, all other states have a sacred duty not to recognize such achievements. The aggressor becomes a paria.
Imposed agreement – deliberately dead to the right The prohibition of war has led to the fact that the power imposed by force can no longer be considered valid. International law uncertainly states: a contract imposed by force or threats is worthless. This term is of respect. It indicates that a contract is imposed does not exist as a legal fact: It is deliberately dead to law and does not create any legal consequences, including rights for the aggressor and responsibilities for the victim of aggression. The contract imposed by force is void from the moment of its conclusion and completely, that is, it is impossible to selectively distinguish certain parts of it and legitimize them.
Therefore, any future “peace agreement”, concluded under the pressure of the use of force (hostilities and attacks that continue) or its threats (for example, statements of Russian officials about the readiness to continue the war forever until Russia’s buildings are fulfilled) will be) worthless. For international law, it will not matter whether Ukraine will officially sign a signature, formally fulfill its requirements, or may even receive some advantages (such as additional weapons). The only agreement that will pass the international law test is that will be concluded with free will of Ukrainewhen it is no longer under pressure from force, but is able to conclude a deal of true will.
Moreover, international law prohibits annexation (that is, the violent accession of territories to another state). This ban is absolutely imperativethat is, no exception or retreat from it in no circumstances. Any provisions of the agreement that legitimize annexation will equally lead to the void of the agreement.
Title on the territory and the right to deny will remain for Ukraine Since the worthless agreement does not create any legal consequences, even if Ukraine has agreed to recognize the occupied territories in Russian, such recognition would not be of real importance. The invalidity of the imposed contract will give the Ukrainian government a legitimate right to appeal territorial changes At any time of the future. Any attempt to approve annexation in the Agreement does not abolish the status of territories as occupied by Russia under international law. Occupation for his part is considered an ongoing armed attack to the territory of another state, even in the absence of active fighting. This means that the state whose territory is occupied does not lose its right to self -defense and the de -occupation of territories, regardless of how long such occupation lasts.
Does international law leave a place for peace agreements at all? In the end, a logical question often arises whether the defined regulation leaves space for concluding peace agreements under international law. It may seem that peace agreements will inevitably be concluded in the context of the use of force, and therefore, will each be automatically violent for a particular side (ie void)? In other words, is the only peace agreement that will be concluded only after the full de -occupation of the Ukrainian territories on exclusively Ukrainian conditions?
Although it would be an ideal scenario – both politically and in terms of international law – is not necessarily a single scenario. International law still leaves space for truce agreements (ceasefire) or various political agreements (for example, the exchange of prisoners of war). However, any agreement that will be interrupted with the principles described above (including the conclusion as a result of force or threat or contrary to the prohibition of annexation) will not pass the test of international law. This will not only give the Government of Ukraine a legitimate right to refuse to fulfill the provisions of such an agreement in the future, but also imposes on all other states the duty not to recognize the situation that has made it As a result of such an agreement, it is legitimate, and to cooperate to overcome such a situation.
What does the world we want to live look like? Often, the abstracts about the inability of international law to effectively counteract Russian aggression, in particular attempts to impose violent and bonded conditions into Ukraine in a potential “peace” agreement. In more radical perception, international law is portrayed as unnecessary toothless rags, which is unable to show true effectiveness. The difference should be made between international law (ie the standardsthat set the gold standard of behavior of states) and mechanisms Response to its violation. The mechanisms can be far from imperfect, but international law, in one way or another, continues to exist and use it. So, we must take the maximum in our favor. And she is still. International law still continues to protect Ukrainian territorial integrity, even if there are no practical mechanisms for coercive Russia to a fair peace. International law transforms any potential agreement imposed on poisoned fruit for Russia in the future.
This means that, even if Ukraine, under pressure, signs a document that can be interpreted in some way as an exchange of territories, no matter how much time has passed, it is all the same – our land that will be considered under occupation. Therefore, Ukraine has the right to return its armed or diplomatic way at any time, retaining a legitimate right to self-defense.
Maxim Vishchych, Legal Advisor GRC, Lecturer in International Law of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
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