Modern Challenges of the Ukrainian Army: What changes does the army need

Almost every day Ukrainian military, volunteers, media and civic activists at various information sites discuss the problems with which the Ukrainian military faces every day during their preparation or during fighting. One of the commentators is an experienced military, someone wants to give them up, and someone wants to bring problems in the public plane that interfere with the tasks. I believe that to judge the competence of these statements and awareness of this issue are the military, not civilians, which often perceive these news by an emotional rather than a rational component.

In essence, the army is a very complex construct. Imagine that you live in a town with a population of 5 thousand people (the same number of servicemen has the average infantry brigade). It contains minibuses, hospital, school, city council, police, municipal service, fire department and a whole bunch of other bodies and institutions responsible for the life of the city. Actually, the army is all the same, but under the other wrapper and with complex names.

It is not difficult for people to be relevant to the army and public service, it is very difficult to grasp the concept of unity and collective responsibility in one bottle, so the purpose of this text is to illuminate several problems and ideas.

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• “TCC – not military.” Russian propaganda and lack of proper communication by the state led to the fact that in 2025 the lion’s share of citizens does not understand that most of the CCC staff are servicemen, and at the same time there are civilian staff in the shopping center. Only the military is handling the stories on the streets. In 2025, the vast majority of them are the military who transferred to the Tax Code and the joint venture after injuries in combat brigades.

What to do: stop making Power Point presentations and publish them on the Ministry of Defense page. You need to shoot short and modern videos and pour them on all popular platforms (Tik Tok, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube). And so, the content promotion of the content must be paid money, but if we do not do it – it will be done by the Russians, what they actually actively do. Hybrid war is waged in different planes, in social networks Russians are constantly trying to undermine confidence in mobilization processes.

• Active implementation of digital solutions and formation of appropriate digital vertical in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Delta, Nettle, Army+ and other array of modern military programs and information and communication systems require a separate vertical in the Office of the Armed Forces, and full-time positions for people who will directly administer these products in units, provide access, and to train people to use these products as much as well.

What to do: Create at least at the battalion level of a full -time “digital officer”, not to translate these responsibilities into communications, or to appoint freelance responsible persons. Who served in the army knows everything freezing is secondary.

• Involvement of the sergeant in situational awareness. In many units, the Soviet principle is still in place that the sergeant needs to provide information immediately before completing the task. Usually, this practice undermines confidence in command. For a long time in our assault unit, the infantrymen believed that the enemy fired only our positions, and we did not fire.

What should be done: to introduce mandatory alternation of platoon and mouth sergeants at the command and surrounding points of the mouth. “From the Earth” the situation always looks different than from the team point where the commander collects all the information and manages the defeat of the enemy in real time. Such a solution will relieve the extra tension between commanders and soldiers at a tactical level.

• Analytical processing of information. Information is the key to win. The sooner we will accumulate and work out arrays of various information, the faster we will see changes in the nature of the enemy’s fighting and, as a consequence, the faster we will adapt our tactics for combat. The faster we work with information, the less human lives we will lose.

What to do: implement the Lesson Learned procedure. Each operation should be analyzed by commanders of all levels. For success, it is necessary to identify the reasons for success, for the unsuccessful to establish all interference. Particular attention should be paid to the unsuccessful cases so that they are not repeated later. Currently, commanders rarely conduct After Action Review (Analysis of the Fight) with their personnel.

• Conducting onboarding (the process of accepting a new employee in a team) for a young replenishment. The times have passed when an unknown soldier = executive soldier (back in 1991). Modern recruits want to have information. It is important to properly adapt the recruits in the new team, to explain to them the structure of the armed forces, the structure of the unit, the vertical of the senior commander, so that there are no situations where fighters cannot explain the basic structure of their unit in two years of service, or do not know the exact name of their position. The more soldiers he learns during adaptation, the less issues he will arise later. The soldier should understand that the platoon commander never comes up with combat missions for his personnel. He is a company commander above him, to whom the order is given by the battalion commander, etc.

What should be done: at the General Staff level, to develop and implement the so-called SHECKLIST-SHE (control lists) practice at least for a tactical link. A recently called a young officer should know that he has a board book (not about statutes, but about practical advice), which briefly describes his further steps in various situations. Conditionally, replenishment arrived: Step 1. Present the platoon management and their functions. Step 2. Re -interview staff for complaints and problematic issues. Step 3. Collect and record personnel data, etc.

• Motivation of service in infantry. It so happened that in 2025, infantrymen are the most powerful organism of the armed forces and the most underestimated in terms of motivation for infantry. To a greater extent, the whole burden of war carries a Ukrainian infantry on its shoulder. In the rain, in the snow, in the heat, under constant shelling of the enemy.

What to do: to introduce a new system of extraordinary titles, to shorten the terms for service in rank for the infantry teams. You are the infantryman and perform combat missions – get the title earlier. Introduce higher swings in infantry positions, you serve in the infantry – to grow to the highest rank in this position. Introduce extra days of infantry holidays. Infantryman? – +5 days before vacation. To introduce a cash allowance for the service in the infantry. Infantry is ours, our wall, our extreme border, our Rubicon.

• Lack of real fighting experience and understanding the modern realities of combat in many officers of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. There are a large number of officers who got there young people in the General Staff and other bodies of the Armed Forces departments The lieutenants and there were colonels. In fact, there is a gap between combat and staff commanders.

What should be done: Introduce the alternation of positions between combat and staff positions for all officers. Do not frighten the word combat, it is a service in combat military units. One title in the military unit, later, such as transfer to command, from there again to promote to the military unit. This will eradicate such a concept as a staff colonel and situations of the type “And what do you have a department of 8 people can not take this point on the map?!”.

• Moral and psychological demotivation of soldiers. There is nothing worse for fighting than a demotivated unit. The falsehood of decisions to throw newly created units immediately in difficult directions without “run -in” in “stable” directions will always lead to large losses.

What to do: primarily all newly created organisms are under the control of brigades that have been fighting for a long time. Two months of fighting in the strip of an experienced crew is tantamount to the year of active harmony and independent acquisition of experience.

• The absence of transparent, clear and clear criteria for obtaining certain types of awards. It is no secret that for most military concepts of state and departmental awards are completely displaced. If you are a good friend of the commander, you will have a large range of awards without participating in hostilities, but you can be an infantryman who will not get out of combat positions and have nothing. Particularly often the highest level state awards are awarded to the military (posthumously inclusive) only after the high level of publicity in the media.

What to do: set mandatory quotas for combat units and clear criteria for obtaining certain types of government and departmental awards, so that there are no cases where the battalion has been involved in active daily battles for more than two months, and no infantryman has yet earned “3 degrees”. The initiative should be rewarded from the state, not from commanders, although the latter should also be left. Involve the personnel of the unit and set quotas for the ordinary and sergeant warehouse in the process of submission, and separately for the officers during the vote, in order to prevent the submission of the commander exclusively to the “people” by the commander.

Finallythe motivation of the fighter to learn and develop. Understanding that personal initiative, successful courses, knowledge of languages, sports and scientific achievements, not ankily and personal acquaintances, will allow you to rise in a career ladder, transparency of criteria necessary for promotion, will allow you to keep the most motivated fighters in a professional.

Michael Onufer

A column is a material that reflects the author’s point of view. The text of the column does not claim the objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic that rises in it. The editorial board of “Ukrainian Truth” is not responsible for the accuracy and interpretation of the information provided and plays only the role of the carrier. The point of view of the UP editorial board may not coincide with the point of view of the author of the column.