Isw analyzed how Russians can use the extension of the bridgehead near the estuary

Analysts of the Institute of War Study (ISW) have named the possible plans of the Russians to promote the estuary of Donetsk region.

Source: Isw

Literally From the report: “Russian troops are expanding their bridgehead to the northeast of the estuary within the framework of mutual reinforcing efforts to create conditions for the capture of Borova and estuary in the coming months.”

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Details: The review notes that the footage, published on March 28 and geolocalized on April 1, show that Russian troops recently advanced northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of the estuary) and possibly seized the village.

Russian troops recently made promotion to the southeast of the new (west of Novolyubivka), and the Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian troops advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northwest of Novolyubivka).

Literally From the report: “Russian troops advanced across the Zherebets River to the western (right) shore in early January 2025 and over the last three months slowly expanded their bridgehead on the right bank.

Russian troops began to attempt to push the Ukrainian forces from their positions on the eastern (left) bank of the Zherebets River at the end of 2023, and only recently created a relatively stable bridgehead from which Russian troops could begin further offensive operations. ”

“It seems that Russian troops use a significant advantage in live power to promote in the area.”

Details: Experts suggest that Russian troops can use their expanded bridgehead northeast of the estuary to support the capture of Borova or estuary in the coming months.

In addition, the occupiers may be trying to combine these bridgeheads to create a stable projection to support attacks southeast of Borova.

Literally From the report: “The Russian forces recently tried to move east and southeast of Borova after advancement northeast of the settlement in January 2025, and they may create a speech northeast of Liman to support future offensive operations against the southern region of the Novosergivka-Novin.

The Russian military command can try to bypass Ukrainian defense in these settlements to force Ukrainian troops to retreat and ensure the promotion of Russians east of Borova and deep into its territory in the coming months. ”

Details: The review also suggests that Russians can try to use the extension of the bridgehead on the western bank of the Zherebets River near Ivanivka to support future Russian surgery for the capture of estuary.

They can try to move to Karlovka from the new and Drobysheve from the well, trying to create a defense position on the Karlovka-Sandriwalove-Drobysheve (on the eastern bank of the Oskil River).

Russian troops can try to make such progress along the Oskil River to challenge Ukrainian positions in the estuary from the northeast.

At the same time, they can try to activate offensive actions near Tornsky (east of the estuary) to press the estuary from the east.

Literally From the report: “Further advancement of the Russians in the direction of Borova and estuary is part of the long efforts of the Russians to push Ukrainian forces from the position on the eastern bank of the Oskil River and to step on to the west of Kharkiv region and to create conditions for the onset of the Ukrainian belt in the Donetsk region from the north”.

Details: According to analysts, Russian troops can also use their bridgehead northeast of the estuary to capture one percent of the Luhansk region, which remained under the control of Ukraine, and to complete the long -standing goal of Russia for the capture of the entire Luhansk region.

Russian troops have been trying to capture the last percent of the Luhansk region (about 266 square kilometers) since the end of November 2024. For the first time, the Russian forces captured the entire Luhansk region on July 3, 2022, but later the Ukrainian forces pushed the army of the Russian Federation.

Experts say that the Kremlin probably wants to use re -admiration and maintenance of the Luhansk region to get levers of influence during ceasefire negotiations and future peace talks.

Literally From the report: “ISW continues to evaluate that Russian officials deliberately inhibit the ceasefire and peace talks in the hope of obtaining more territory for use during future peace talks.”

Key conclusions ISW for April 1:

• It is reported that Russian troops continue shelling of Ukrainian energy infrastructure against the background of current negotiations on the details of the ceasefire and impact on energy infrastructure, which indicates that Russia may use blurred or unfinished ceasefire. of greater range or fpv-Dron.
• High -ranking Russian officials continue to repeat Russia’s demands for the elimination of “fundamental causes” of war in Ukraine as a preconditions for the conclusion of a peace agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial demands in the war, which are directly contrary to the purpose of US President Donald Trump to achieve long -term peace in Ukraine.
• Russian troops are expanding their bridgehead to the northeast of the estuary as part of a mutual enhancement effort to create conditions for the capture of Borova and estuary in the coming months.
• Russian troops can use their expanded bridgehead northeast of the estuary to support the capture of Borova or estuary in the coming months.
• Russian troops can also use their bridgehead northeast of the estuary to capture one percent of the Luhansk region, which remained under the control of Ukraine, and to complete the long -standing goal of Russia for the capture of the entire Luhansk region.
• On April 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on raising the salaries of Russian governors since January 2026, leveling them with the salaries of Vice Prime Ministers of the Russian Federation.
• Recently, Russian troops have advanced in the Kursk and Belgorod regions, as well as in Lymansky, Pokrovsky and Kurakhovka.