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Additional correction was made by the chairman of the budget committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Roksolana Podlas. She, referring to a briefing with representatives of the IMF and the EU, explained that the amount of 65 billion euros is a medium -term estimate for four years (2026–2029) and not a one -time need for one budget year. The IMF traditionally thinks in such categories.
At the same time, this approach does not reduce the scale of the problem: in the next two years, Ukraine’s need is estimated at 20-30 billion euros annually, and this is already confirmed by all parties. Moreover, these calculations have a high proportion of uncertainty: they rely on assumptions about the duration of war and defense expenditures. It is possible to predict 2027, but it is rather a theory than a practical budget plan.
According to information, the starting volume of the new IMF program, which is now being prepared for Ukraine, is about $ 8 billion. It is important support and market signal, but it is not able to block the needs for even one year. The EU programs – Ukraine Facility and Era Loans – remain the starting ground for basic funding. They already work and have flexibility to scaling. In part, their service is carried out at the expense of income from frozen Russian assets.
But the central question sounds increasingly clear: partners have liquidity to satisfy a shortage of 20-30 billion euros every year? It is here that the idea of repair loans (Reüarathations Loan) comes to the fore. The logic is simple: frozen Russian assets in the form of cash in the ECB accounts, which are estimated at 170-180 billion euros, can be used to produce Eurobonds that will be redeemed for these funds and, accordingly, such involvement will cover Ukrainian needs.
The recent discussions include a figure of 130 billion euros of a repair loan. It is worth explaining the logic: as it was noted, the total amount of frozen assets, which can potentially participate in this project, is estimated at 175 billion euros.
If, on their basis, so -called repair bonds are issued, it is important to keep in mind that some of these funds will go to repay the existing obligations for ERA Loans, the amount of payments for which is about 45 billion euros. Almost 19 billion euros from this amount belong to the US, that is, in fact it will be about the refund of non-EU member funds.
As a result, the United States will receive borrowed funds, but guarantees that Washington will continue to participate in the project of repair loans or similar mechanisms. That is why it is extremely important to keep the US and the G7 countries in the partner circuit – even if they do not participate in the issue of bonds itself, their role should be enshrined in the form of international financial guarantees.
These can be, for example, the so-called Backtop mechanisms. Their logic is that in the event of an event that requires rapid payments or covering of obligations, part of the risk is taken by strong players – G7 or the United States.
Another possible tool is Fed Swap Line. This is the US Federal Reserve Line. It is a tool used between the central banks of developed countries for emergency access to dollar liquidity. It proven itself well in 2008 during the financial crisis, as well as in 2020 during the pandemic. The use of such a tool in the context of a reparation loan would mean that the EU and the coalition will not be at risk itself, and Ukraine will retain support for the United States.
At this point, the position of Germany is gaining special importance. If Berlin demonstrated maximum caution in the topic of frozen Russian assets, now the German government has publicly recognized the willingness to support the “creative plan” of the EU, which allows to direct these funds in favor of Ukraine without direct confiscation. It is an option when frozen assets become the basis for the issue of Eurobonds, and the resulting liquidity goes to financing Ukrainian needs.
This change weighs a lot. Germany is the largest EU economy, and its consent usually removes key barriers for making decisions in Brussels. If Berlin is involved in the development and implementation of the Reparations Loans mechanism, even in the case of resistance from individual countries (such as Hungary or Slovakia), a critical mass is appeared in the EU. In fact, Germany’s position becomes a catalyst that can translate the idea from a theoretical plane into a practical one.
Thus, we go to a simple conclusion: the discussion is no longer about “how many Ukraine needs.” It is clear-20-30 billion euros a year in the next two years.
The real question is “where to get these funds from, which mechanics to design them and how to keep the US, Germany and the G7 country in partnership.” It will depend not only on the implementation of the budget-2026, but also the financial stability of Ukraine during the war and restoration.
The column is a type of material that reflects only the author’s point of view. It does not claim the objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic in question. The point of view of the editorial board of “Economic Truth” and “Ukrainian Truth” may not coincide with the author’s view. The editorial board is not responsible for the accuracy and interpretation of the information provided and plays the role of the carrier exclusively.
”, – WRITE: www.pravda.com.ua
Additional correction was made by the chairman of the budget committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Roksolana Podlas. She, referring to a briefing with representatives of the IMF and the EU, explained that the amount of 65 billion euros is a medium -term estimate for four years (2026–2029) and not a one -time need for one budget year. The IMF traditionally thinks in such categories.
At the same time, this approach does not reduce the scale of the problem: in the next two years, Ukraine’s need is estimated at 20-30 billion euros annually, and this is already confirmed by all parties. Moreover, these calculations have a high proportion of uncertainty: they rely on assumptions about the duration of war and defense expenditures. It is possible to predict 2027, but it is rather a theory than a practical budget plan.
According to information, the starting volume of the new IMF program, which is now being prepared for Ukraine, is about $ 8 billion. It is important support and market signal, but it is not able to block the needs for even one year. The EU programs – Ukraine Facility and Era Loans – remain the starting ground for basic funding. They already work and have flexibility to scaling. Partly their service It is dreamed of income from frozen Russian assets.
But the central question sounds increasingly clear: partners have liquidity to satisfy a shortage of 20-30 billion euros every year? It is here that the idea of repair loans (Reüarathations Loan) comes to the fore. The logic is simple: frozen Russian assets in the form of cash in the ECB accounts, which are estimated at 170-180 billion euros, can be used to produce Eurobonds that will be redeemed for these funds and, accordingly, such involvement will cover Ukrainian needs.
The recent discussions include a figure of 130 billion euros of a repair loan. It is worth explaining the logic: as it was noted, the total amount of frozen assets, which can potentially participate in this project, is estimated at 175 billion euros.
If, on their basis, so -called repair bonds are issued, it is important to keep in mind that some of these funds will go to repay the existing obligations for ERA Loans, the amount of payments for which is about 45 billion euros. Almost 19 billion euros from this amount belong to the US, that is, in fact it will be about the refund of non-EU member funds.
As a result, the United States will receive borrowed funds, but guarantees that Washington will continue to participate in the project of repair loans or similar mechanisms. That is why it is extremely important to keep the US and the G7 countries in the partner circuit – even if they do not participate in the issue of bonds itself, their role should be enshrined in the form of international financial guarantees.
These can be, for example, the so-called Backtop mechanisms. Their logic is that in the event of an event that requires rapid payments or covering of obligations, part of the risk is taken by strong players – G7 or the United States.
Another possible tool is Fed Swap Line. This is the US Federal Reserve Line. It is a tool used between the central banks of developed countries for emergency access to dollar liquidity. It proven itself well in 2008 during the financial crisis, as well as in 2020 during the pandemic. The use of such a tool in the context of a reparation loan would mean that the EU and the coalition will not be at risk itself, and Ukraine will retain support for the United States.
At this point, the position of Germany is gaining special importance. If Berlin demonstrated maximum caution in the topic of frozen Russian assets, now the German government has publicly recognized the willingness to support the “creative plan” of the EU, which allows to direct these funds in favor of Ukraine without direct confiscation. It is an option when frozen assets become the basis for the issue of Eurobonds, and the resulting liquidity goes to financing Ukrainian needs.
This change weighs a lot. Germany is the largest EU economy, and its consent usually removes key barriers for making decisions in Brussels. If Berlin is involved in the development and implementation of the Reparations Loans mechanism, even in the case of resistance from individual countries (such as Hungary or Slovakia), a critical mass is appeared in the EU. In fact, Germany’s position becomes a catalyst that can translate the idea from a theoretical plane into a practical one.
Thus, we go to a simple conclusion: the discussion is no longer about “how many Ukraine needs.” It is clear-20-30 billion euros a year in the next two years.
The real question is “where to get these funds from, which mechanics to design them and how to keep the US, Germany and the G7 country in partnership.” It will depend not only on the implementation of the budget-2026, but also the financial stability of Ukraine during the war and restoration.
The column is a type of material that reflects only the author’s point of view. It does not claim the objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic in question. The point of view of the editorial board of “Economic Truth” and “Ukrainian Truth” may not coincide with the author’s view. The editorial board is not responsible for the accuracy and interpretation of the information provided and plays the role of the carrier exclusively.