Ground robotic complexes in Ukraine: how to turn combat experience into a system that works

Ground robotic complexes (GRC) today are at roughly the same stage of development as drones were at the beginning of 2023. They are already fighting. They have proven their effectiveness in logistics, evacuation, reconnaissance and even in the shock component. But they are not scalable yet.

This is not a problem of technology: Ukrainian manufacturers are already making NRK, ready for use “out of the box”, switching to digital communication, improving management. This is not a problem of motivation at the level of combat units, on the contrary, today a real demand for the development of this direction is being formed from below. The problem is much simpler and at the same time more complex: NRCs develop without a single focus and coordination.

How UAVs were scaled and why NRC is more difficult Compared to aerial drones, their explosive development was made possible by the initiative of combat units. They started using FPV themselves and it quickly became mainstream. Producers and funds stepped up, educational initiatives emerged.

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However, there is no single body that coordinates the entire area of ​​UAVs at the national level. There are many good initiatives: the Unmanned Systems Force, the Office of Unmanned Systems, other institutions that influence the development of the industry. But the system works primarily due to volume and mass.

For NRK, such a scenario is much more complicated. Ground-based drones involve a higher entry threshold and more complex infrastructure. Premises, workshops, work with metal, mechanics, electronics, communication are needed. One NRC is several times more expensive than an FPV drone, and its adaptation to combat conditions can reach up to 2.5 thousand dollars.

That is why ground-based robotic complexes cannot scale “by themselves” as quickly as UAVs.

The NRK ecosystem is already forming, coordination is needed By the NRK ecosystem, I do not mean an abstract concept or individual projects. This is a combination of all elements without which ground robotic complexes cannot work and scale: combat units, manufacturers, training schools, workshops, recruiting, logistics, service, volunteers and government programs.

It is important to understand: the ecosystem is formed by itself. The question is not its existence. It already exists in Ukraine, it’s just that today it is developing without a clear focus and agreed priorities.

Without coordination, development is slower than war allows. Resources are scattered, the actions of individual structures are not synchronized, and the most critical problems: people, infrastructure, repairs, training – are solved fragmentarily.

Coordination is not needed for control’s sake. It is needed to accelerate development, set priorities correctly and direct resources to where they will have the maximum effect.

What does a combat-ready unit of the People’s Liberation Army begin with? The NRK unit is not just drone operators. This is the infrastructure without which the equipment does not work stably. The minimum required for effective operation: workshops with tools and spare parts, command and control points with reliable communication and power, transport and trailers, generators, space for “clean” and “dirty” work, residential infrastructure.

In reality, it is the workshops that remain the weakest point of the system. In many states, they either do not exist at all, or they exist formally. Even where workshops are provided, the established positions often do not correspond to the actual needs of the unit. There are no tools, there is no material base, so the units are forced to independently find funds for equipment, purchase of tools, components and consumables.

State mechanisms are just beginning to appear. A marketplace for components is being opened on Brave1, where in the future, I hope, they will be available for e-points. The supply of spare parts could potentially be arranged by the Logistics Command. But until it became a stable norm, every malfunction means simple equipment and lost time.

There are people. There is no focus on attracting them However, even the best infrastructure does not work without specialists who are able to maintain, repair and develop it. And here we focus on the second key point – recruiting.

There are people. The problem is not their absence, but the lack of focus on attracting them. Today, the direction of the NRK is objectively not a priority, and that is why it is difficult to recruit for it. New staff structures are appearing, but there is no systematic work on their filling, neither at the expense of internal resources, nor at the expense of external resources.

It is important to understand: there is no “personnel crisis” as such in the NRC. It has its own specifics and competencies. For operators, the key factor is motivation: learning how to operate an UAV is easier than an UAV, the tactics are different, but the entry threshold is lower.

Now the biggest shortage is not among operators, but among engineering specialties. We need mechanics, locksmiths, welders – people who worked with cars, machinery, metal. We need radio and electrical engineers, communications specialists, programmers and network engineers who can configure complex control systems and IP networks. All these people are in the civilian sector, among veterans and within the military. The only question is whether the system sees them and knows how to work with them.

In order to launch a working model of recruitment for the NRC, political will is needed from above and a clear signal that this direction is a priority. It is necessary to use an internal resource: to give commanders the opportunity to transfer motivated and relevant specialists to NRK units. At the BZVP stage, priority quotas should be established for this direction and basic training modules should be integrated with the NRC.

An external circuit should work in parallel: a media campaign that explains what the NRC is, why it is important and who exactly we are looking for; involvement of all recruiting centers of various branches of the military; work with veterans and civilian specialists. This is not a complicated model, it just needs a systematic approach and a clearly defined priority.

How to scale the experience, not reinvent everything Today, individual divisions already have systematic experience in the application of NRC and pass it on to others. But at the level of all Defense Forces, these are still point initiatives. At the same time, if each new unit of the NRC is forced to independently go through the entire path from the very beginning, we lose time and resources.

The solution lies in a multi-level training system. A basic understanding of the NRC should appear already at the BZVP stage. Also – integration of training in reserve battalions, universities. And the key element is mandatory training in combat units that already intensively use NRK. The optimal term is about a month: this time is enough for a person not only to learn how to operate the equipment, but to understand how the entire system is built.

This is how the transfer of experience in the Third Assault Division works: servicemen from other units undergo training, and then return with a practical understanding of how to deploy an NRK unit at home. This allows you to scale not individual solutions, but the finished model.

A single architect: how the state can scale NRC If we look at the development of the NRK honestly, the state today is not so much “lagging behind” as it is not having time to assemble everything that already exists into a single system. The problems are known: recruiting, training, repair, standardization, analytics, support of manufacturers. All this partially works. But it works differently.

The first and most critical need is people. Without a focus on filling the staff structures of NRK units, any other decisions lose their meaning. Next is training: programs exist, but they are not uniform, tactics change faster than standards are updated. Training in combat units is available, but it is not established as a mandatory element of the system. Analytics and statistics are just starting to work, although without data it is impossible to forecast needs or plan purchases.

A separate block — manufacturers. Today, they are often left alone with risks, from contracts and financing to the relocation and planning of production facilities. Without predictability and state support, it is impossible to build service infrastructure, invest in R&D and think one step ahead. And this is what determines whether we will be ahead of the enemy tomorrow.

Therefore, speaking as pragmatically as possible, one solution can have the greatest effect already this year: the creation of a single institution – the architect of the NRK ecosystem.

It should be a structure that does not engage in “manual management”, but is responsible for coordination: recruiting and staffing, training and internship standards, analytics and feedback from the front, service and repair, interaction with manufacturers, forecasting needs and industry development. The point where combat experience, industry and the state converge.

In 2025, the NRK direction has already taken a big step forward. New divisions, companies and battalions of the NRC have appeared, thousands of equipment have been contracted, e-balls have been launched, steps have been taken to open exports, technologies are being improved, and a training base is being formed. Ground drones have already saved thousands of lives and transported hundreds of tons of cargo. Ukraine actually became one of the leaders in this direction.

The next step is to stop developing NRK in fragments. And go to the system. Because in the modern war, the winner is not the one who has individual strong solutions, but the one who is able to quickly scale the working experience.

Victor Pavlov

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