“Europe’s security through unanimity and determination”, — write: www.pravda.com.ua
This material was written for the Polish edition Eastern Flank Instituteit was published on the website of the analytical center on October 20, 2025.
The war in Ukraine was the result of a whole set of mistakes in foreign policy that had been carried out since independence. Since the beginning of the 90s, our leadership has declared the so-called multi-vector policy, the intention to have good relations both with the West and with Russia, trying to benefit from both directions.
In addition, such a policy led the country to great trouble and did not give the opportunity to resist external influences for a long time. This allowed us to receive economic benefits both from Europe and the USA (through loans and investments), as well as to take advantage of preferential prices for Russian gas and to have access to Russian markets.
At that time, Russia systematically increased its influence inside the country, supporting loyal political parties and individual figures, as well as economic pressure – through energy carriers and investing in strategic enterprises, propaganda in the mass media and support of the Russian-speaking environment.
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But perhaps the most important mistake was the underestimation of Russia and excessive trust in the security guarantees that were laid down by the Budapest Memorandum.
When in 2014, a war broke out, none of the major powers came to the rescue, limiting themselves only to sanctions against Russia. This indicates that that international agreements are not supported concrete safety tools – just an empty place. On which, looking for space, war will surely come.
We remember Ukraine today precisely because of the situation in which our state found itself in the fourth year of a full-scale war, the likes of which humanity has not yet seen in the 21st century.
Whether everything described above does not apply to anyone else, besides Ukraine, I cannot say. Only one thing is clear: Russia is militarizing today, its economy is running on military rails, and society is pumped with propaganda. What she did with you, neighbors, yesterday is still worth checking, and why she is doing it today – we need to find out.
And even today, the Russians see no reason why they should stop. The war in the center of Europe not only affected every Ukrainian, it became global under the roar of the old world that is collapsing and is about to knock on the neighbor’s house. A neighbor who lives with us on the same small floor and is called Europe. We will talk about her. About Europe as a neighbor in a global war.
In the fourth year of the war, it is safe to say that the process that began in February 2022, like any major war, led to the collapse of the ideas and theories on which it was based the very idea of the world order.
All those who thought they knew everything, or those who thought worry was a panacea, were deeply disappointed.
Everyone involved in this war, even those watching it, saw something they did not plan for or expect.
Some even now, in the agony of disappointment in their own illusions, continue to claim that everything that happens is only about those illusions.
However, the truth is that for some it is grief and pain, and for others it is still a dry chronicle. However, this is definitely a whirlwind of events that will change the world forever.
What is happening today in this vortex that is gathering momentum with the tacit consent of the already defunct old world?
On the night of September 27-28, 2025, 552 UAVs, no less than 2 ballistic missiles and no less than 31 cruise missiles were used on the territory of Ukraine. On the night of September 6-7, the largest use of air attack was recorded – as many as 776 at the same time. More recently, two dozen Russian drones entered Poland, of which three or four were shot down using ultra-expensive missiles.
In just a few days, Russian planes calmly entered the airspace of Estonia. They were pursued by two Italian most modern NATO F-35 fighters, which took off to intercept from the airbase, for 50 kilometers from Tallinn.
Not long after, The Telegraph eloquently described NATO’s reaction.
“The Italians began the standard interception procedure, swinging their wings from side to side. The Russians responded by swinging theirs. Then one of the pilots raised his hand and waved. Over the next 12 minutes, the Italian pilots escorted the Russians all the way to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad – an unprecedentedly long time for an invasion of NATO airspace.”the article says.
So, connecting only these events from the vortex of total war, let’s draw a simple conclusion: while Europe decides whether their reaction was decisive enough, the Russians release the next thousands of drones, and the Ukrainians, surviving themselves, continue to buy time for their neighbors. Time to get rid of, first of all, illusions.
I repeat again, four years of hostilities outline revolutionary changes in military affairs. Already now we can confidently say about the emergence of a new type of war and radical changes in the art of war for the entire XXI century.
One of the main features of such a war is that no country in the world is able to independently withstand the current level of intensity of hostilities and fully satisfy the entire complex of defense needs.
So, in order to survive, we need to find the answer to a number of questions in the context of the ongoing war. But the main thing is to provide the necessary own security guarantees in the future.
First. Is there a real way for Ukraine today to obtain the necessary level of cooperation with Europe in order to meet the needs of today’s war as much as possible?
At the same time, in the program of such survival, we are interested in:
- How realistic is the hope of receiving military aid in the form of air defense systems and ammunition from Europe.
- How realistic is it in the near future to get access to a financial resource to finance your own defense industry.
- How realistic is it to gain access to exceptional European scientific and industrial technologies, including satellite ones.
- As quickly as possible to organize our production and its scaling on the territory of Europe.
Second. Does Europe, intensifying its own efforts to transform defense policy, really seek to build a new security architecture? Does Ukraine have a place in it?
Here, taking into account our own experience, it is appropriate to understand:
- Is there political will to make drastic changes in the security landscape of Europe?
- Are there signs of the formation of European Armed Forces as the basis of combat capabilities and future alliances.
- How realistic is the reform and consolidation of Europe’s defense industry.
- How realistic it looks today to meet Ukraine’s urgent needs within the framework of the reform of Europe’s defense industry.
Despite the many conversations held at various venues both in Ukraine and in Europe, and the next set of sanctions being postponed, today there is only one program document that has appeared on the territory of Europe.
It is about a common one “White Paper on European Defense Preparedness until 2030”which was prepared by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on March 19, 2025.
Obviously, this document is also a reaction to the work of a group of European experts led by Mario Draghi (former president of the European Central Bank), who in September 2024 prepared a comprehensive document called “The Future of European Competitiveness”.
For the first time, it concentratedly emphasizes the need for Europe’s strategic autonomy in the face of growing competition, particularly with the United States.
In addition to describing the problems that befell the European Union, Draghi’s report contains an action plan and suggests immediate implementation of the specified steps, with a special emphasis on coordination in the field of defense industry in Europe.
In this regard, the presentation of the Joint White Paper for European Defense Readiness 2030 conceptual document by the European Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius, is, of course, an answer to the indicated problems.
Indeed, the “White Paper” defines both the threats and challenges facing Europe now and will grow in the future, as well as directions for their neutralization through the development of the European security and defense sector.
This document, written already under the pressure of war, should probably globally convince Europe that it is capable of defending itself.
Meanwhile, for now, this official material remains almost the only prescribed way for us to achieve at least some idea of the formation of future European security, which is obviously based on the strengthening of the European defense industry.
The extremely difficult situation currently existing in Ukraine and my own experience give me the right to look at the security of Europe precisely from practical, in particular, military considerations.
The main goal, of course, is to find out whether Ukraine can fully count on Europe in the war of attrition – if not as an ally, then at least as a reliable partner.
The second and no less important for us: to find out whether Europe understands the need to form a new security architecture on the European continent.
For this, I will recall the words of one classic of military strategy. At the beginning of the 20th century, he wrote:
“In modern realities, peace itself is primarily the result of violence and is supported by violence. Every state border is the result of war; and the outlines of all states on the map introduce us to the strategic and political thinking of the winners, and political geography and peace treaties are also a strategic lesson…”
So, precisely in view of the strategic lessons that we in Ukraine received today, waging a war with the largest empire on the continent, I would like to point out that the very definition of security and its unconditional achievement is based on fairly simple concepts that do not change over time, and most importantly – tested by our war.
First is the political will in terms of readiness for practical, particularly unpopular steps to ensure this very security.
An example of such political will was Winston Churchill (1874–1965), a British politician, Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1940–1945 and 1951–1955, who is a key figure during the Second World War.
A legitimate question today: to what extent are the citizens of the EU member states and their political elites ready to prioritize defense issues, if this means, for example, the deterioration of economic well-being?
Second – the armed forces are well trained and equipped with modern weapons with modern doctrines. These armed forces, moreover, must be formed into a clear hierarchical system based on a unified system of command and doctrine of application.
Even in our conditions, where the centralized subordination of the defense forces is legislated, there was not always enough time for compatible standardization in matters of armament, training and use.
The third – defense-industrial complex. One of the important components that fully determines the readiness of the armed forces to implement their capabilities in matters of security.
At the same time, taking into account our experience, when talking about the defense industry as a component of security, it is necessary to understand that globally this defense-industrial complex will be determined by the following criteria:
1. Availability of raw materials, primarily for the production of ammunition. It is especially important to find out whether today, for example, there are enough components for the production of gunpowder as the basis of all explosives.
As you know, nitrocellulose is the basis of its formula. It can be obtained after processing cellulose from industrial hemp, cotton and wood. Does this program provide for increased cultivation of these crops, or perhaps it will be in a cooperative?
And how will the issue be resolved with the same chips and microcircuits manufactured in completely different global regions?
2. The availability of technologies, infrastructure (enterprises and transport) that can be expanded and reorganized for maximum production precisely in the interests of defense.
Such an infrastructure must be united politically, economically and by common standards and supply chains. Will this not harm, for example, national governments, which form their incomes and budgets at the expense of such national infrastructure.
3. A labor force of sufficient number and skill to meet the needs of all branches of production. Adequacy and qualification, especially in high-tech areas, will be decisive in the implementation of any production programs and requests.
4. Still the same political will, when through coercion, propaganda and appeals to the fulfillment of civic duty, the civilian population is motivated not only to certain restrictions, but also to future victims, even if they are unbearable.
Therefore, it is necessary to look at this first system document only from a strategic point of view, especially in the perspective of its not only the present, but also its mandatory foresight.
The war in Ukraine, the review of the role of the United States in ensuring European security, and the increase in the combat capability of Russia’s armed forces, which go beyond the scope of today’s war, should form only a realistic vision of the future security architecture.
However, studying the specified document, looking specifically at our and the European perspective, we can state that the declared distribution of money is absolutely not enough to achieve the main goal of this document. Unfortunately, Europe needs both political will and time.
Speaking specifically about political will as the main driver of such progress, one must understand: today it means that the success of these initiatives will depend on the political will of all 27 different countries. These countries, having passed the extremely difficult path to membership, nevertheless have different priorities, resources and vision of the threat.
That is probably why the “White Book” constantly emphasizes that defense remains the prerogative of individual states and a matter of unanimitywhich is stipulated by the Treaty on the European Union.
Will this become a factor in slowing down or blocking key defense projects – we’ll see later However, it is absolutely impossible to achieve the implementation of the main principle of a centralized approach to the formation of one’s own security in such an approach.
With regard to the production base, a wide field for work also opens up. It is worth noting that, according to the same Draghi report, more than 60% of defense purchases in Europe are made in the US. This is as it stands today.
But this state needs to be expanded, and accordingly, the country-fragmented military-industrial base will clearly need political will and time to scale.
Speaking about personnel, it is necessary to remember the well-developed labor law, which does not allow neglecting the standards of working conditions. Whether there are enough specialists today and where their training will be organized is difficult to say.
We understand very well who is working in the factories in Europe today. It is already possible to predict how this will affect the increase in production capacity.
Of course, talking in fact about the preparation for “not the Second World War”, this “White Paper” also declares the desire for leadership in the field of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersound and robotics.
However, in terms of the level of investment, human resources and maturity, all these industries in Europe lag behind the USA and China by many years. It is obvious that achieving such ambitious goals by 2030 is unrealistic.
We will remind that the main reasons for the creation of the European Union were the desire for peace and stability, the stimulation of economic development through the common market, as well as the support of democracy and common values. All this was accompanied an absolute security guarantee from the USA and NATO.
Therefore, it is logical that the European Union itself currently lacks clear mechanisms of so-called coercion. As a result, there is no basis for the realization of political will.
Therefore, the implementation of the intentions stated in this document will be based on “motivation” and “encouragement”, without creating mandatory mechanisms.
This, of course, encourages large countries such as France, Germany, and Italy to continue developing national projects. Other countries will remain outside such opportunities. How this will affect the declared capabilities of the rest of the national armed forces of the EU countries is currently unknown.
Looking at the implementation of such a project, it is worth paying attention to the fact that despite leaving NATO as a priority for security, the EU is already developing cooperation within Europe. For example, through the Kensington Treaty between Great Britain and Germany, the Aachen Treaty between Germany and France, the updated House of Lancaster Agreements between Great Britain and France.
Are these treaties taken into account in the future vision and what, for example, is the role of Great Britain, which is not a member of the EU, but is located on the European continent and still retains its potential?
This program document has already been widely studied and analyzed. Its saturation with declarative statements and formulations made it possible for a wide circle in Ukraine to find both benefits and shortcomings in this document.
For us, the main thing is that despite the ambitious goals declared for supporting Ukraine, all this will probably be carried out without deadlines and mechanisms for mandatory implementation and, as a result, without corresponding guarantees.
Therefore, despite high expectations, it is precisely in the security of Europe, in its practical sense, that dependence on the USA will remain.
At the same time, emphasizing cooperation, interaction and competitiveness of the defense industry, the “White Paper” provides ample opportunities for the promotion of our individual interests and opens the way for Ukraine as a country outside the EU, giving it the opportunityperhaps one day on equal footing to “enter” the Military Industry United under the influence of Russia.
In the absence of binding mechanisms, our main activity will be active promotion at the governmental, business and expert levels of the Ukrainian defense industry’s own interests as part of the European market, which may be opening up.
It is necessary to fight for finance, technology and production with every country that interests us, remembering that the basis of our power is in our technology and practices of use.
It is this approach that will not only protect Ukraine, but also can turn our defense industry into a point of economic growth, similar to what happened in Israel and South Korea.
Therefore, despite the determination of European countries to take more responsibility for their own security, concrete concepts of a new defense architecture will probably only begin to take shape.
Thus, against the background of proposals for the consolidation of the defense industry and the declaration of collective combat capabilities, the “White Paper” for the period up to 2030 does not plan the main thing – the formation of joint military structures within the EU and bodies and structures capable of managing them.
All this shows that, despite the fact that the “White Paper” declares that the EU will prepare for the deterrence of external armed aggression, and for this purpose the EU member states should possess a full range of military capabilities, it remains unclear who in the EU will be responsible for the implementation of joint projects, the development of joint capabilities, as well as to manage and use these capabilities within, for example, joint operations or airspace control outside NATO.
Speaking specifically about military capabilities, I will also note that obtaining them in modern conditions is possible only through the implementation of a single comprehensive system of transformations in a number of industries:
- development and implementation of the latest technologies;
- the radical reform of the defense-industrial complex, carried out in a strict state program;
- logistics and procurement, taking into account rapid and drastic changes in needs;
- management processes not only on the battlefield, but also in state structures to achieve a political goal;
- the structure of the Defense Forces and the Armed Forces as the main carriers of capabilities;
- doctrines of preparation and use of all components of the defense forces.
Then it is obvious that By 2030, the EU will rely only on NATO and, accordingly, the USA to ensure its own security. Therefore, it is definitely premature to talk about the strategic autonomy of Europe from the USA.
The EU will probably increase the share of its own weapons in parallel, trying to increase production volumes, in particular, those that will be produced together with Ukraine.
The formation of a new European security architecture is probably not considered the most important task until 2030. And if it is considered, then only declaratively and focusing on the re-equipment of the national armed forces of the Union countries.
Thus, in its foreign policy, the EU will concentrate on preserving the existing format of ensuring its own security, trying to keep the USA in the focus of its attention.
Accordingly, the involvement of Ukraine as a full-fledged player in the future architecture of European security is neither formally nor fundamentally considered, except partial use of combat experience and assistance in the war with Russia, following a strategy of avoiding war by supporting a neighbor already at war.
It is obvious that while the components of the defense system are missing in Europe, the only way for the much-needed integration of Ukraine into the European defense system, primarily anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense, is to continue working with NATO and its members that share borders with Russia or have historical reservations. This is almost the only way to bypass both political and other blockades within the EU, despite the fact that such a step carries significant geopolitical risks for the member states.
Nevertheless, speaking of readiness for war as the main factor of combat capability, I would like to remind you that our experience of waging such a war already demonstrates that:
- War can be long. And therefore, it completely changes the approach to the organization of the Armed Forces itself.
- New technologies have entered the battlefield, the mastery of which requires not only a replacement of weapons, but also a radical replacement of strategy, doctrine, and training.
- The war has become hybrid. It is conducted with absolute brutality both on the front line and inside the country, using all, including the information capabilities of the state itself.
- It is in modern conflicts that the role of the private sector has grown and continues to grow, which requires a completely different approach in shaping relations between the state and private business. The so-called public-private partnership is emerging, which provides for the admission of private business and foreign capital not only to production, but also to the development of weapons and military equipment.
- In the conditions of a war of attrition, personnel plays a vital role. Their training and education becomes critical. This applies not only to the management of military operations, but also to the field of defense industry, where the integration of universities and, for example, design bureaus is also necessary in the context of the integration of scientific centers and production.
- The key to successful military operations is effective logistics and logistical support. They are the priority targets in the war of attrition. Unfortunately, such problems cannot be solved simply by looking at transport corridors. And it is also important to remember that the basis of logistics is the uninterrupted supply, in particular, of electrical energy, which, as already understood, must not only be protected, but also defended. The same electricity, in case of its absence, painfully hits both civil infrastructure and people. This is a set of measures where military participation cannot be dispensed with. Conclusion: European security, despite the goals declared in the document, will continue to depend only on the stability of Ukraine and its Armed Forces, as well as the future effective partnership.
As predicted, it takes at least 5 years to create a new architecture of the European continentwhich will be accompanied by both inertia associated with the hope of preserving an acceptable way of existence and overcoming barriers in a democratic society.
I would also like to add that for almost four years of war in Ukraine, Russia is systematically learning to fight better. It has already built a new army that collects, analyzes and immediately implements combat experience. All this is finalized in the development of new doctrines and training programs.
The national composition of prisoners entering the Armed Forces may also indicate the transfer of this unique experience to countries such as China, Iran and North Korea. And so, this indicates the inevitable large-scale reform of the armed forces of the Russian Federation both during the war and, possibly, in the post-war period.
Taking into account the development trends of scientific and technical progress in the conditions of modern hostilities and the completion of the formation of a fundamentally new doctrine of warfare, such a reform will obviously be completed no later than 2030. These will be the armed forces of robots, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, united by experience and existing doctrines.
And most importantly, they will be able to scale their new capabilities to the required level. This will be a new arms race for the right to control the global security system.
Already today, the participants in this new arms race are not difficult to predict. These are definitely not those who only want to rearm profitably. I do not see all this in the structures of the NATO armies, which will probably be ready for war with armies that no longer exist.
Looking back on our history, probably another problem of our past leaders was to put off unpopular steps for short-term popularity and follow populist promises.
Obviously, in order to speed up institutional defense readiness in a democratic society, it is necessary to conduct a dialogue with this society. Who will start this dialogue first – whether European governments or the Russian army – depends on us and our partners.
Only our joint work will allow Ukraine to share not only its grief, but also its unique experience of waging war, which will help the EU states to improve their defense strategies as soon as possible, and not only in the field of defense-industrial cooperation.
Valery ZaluzhnyiAmbassador of Ukraine to Great Britain, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (2021–2024)
A column is a type of material that reflects exclusively the point of view of the author. It does not claim objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic in question. The point of view of the editors of “Economic Pravda” and “Ukrainian Pravda” may not coincide with the author’s point of view. The editors are not responsible for the reliability and interpretation of the given information and perform exclusively the role of a carrier.
