“Air Force is one of the latest types of troops that exist for a little over 100 years in militaristic history: the first combat flight was carried out during the Italian-Ottoman war in 1911, Pilot Pierre Julio Gavotty.”, – WRITE: www.pravda.com.ua
However, within 35 years after the USA Gavotta flight, the United States formed a strategic air command, and on March 10, 1945, 300 B-29 bombers simultaneously dropped 1,665 tons of ignition bombs into Tokyo-equivalent of 85 fully loaded trucks.
Under the circumstances of such rapid development, the doctrine of Duke, the concept of the Italian General Julio Due, was developed in the First World War, which envisages victory in the war through strategic bombardment that should break the moral spirit of the nation and force it to be surrendered.
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Duke believed that in the case of domination in air air defense was not able to withstand bombers and other threats. His ideas were greatly influenced on the development of aviation strategies: the Duke doctrine with variable success was implemented in the bombing of Germany, during the “Fire Storm over Japan”, in the Korean War, in Vietnam and Yugoslavia. Today, the same concept is trying to apply the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
But with the threats from the sky, Ukrainian air defense also develops. Thus, since 2022, the defenders of the sky “overgrown with muscles”, integrating numerous types of SDRs and HCCs, Western fighters, DRLV aircraft, anti -aircraft UAVs and even laser interception systems. The strengthening is quite reasonable, because in September 2022 the first precursors of the future terror arrived – “the Armed Forces were reflected Massive Apply immediately four ShahED-136 “, and on June 1, 2025, the enemy released 427 UAVs of different types that were hit in hospitals and power plants-a typical Duke Doctrine.
The decision, according to the Cabinet of Ministers, is the scale of the tactics of mobile firing groups by engaging in the performance of the aircraft functions of a wider range of citizens. So, first, the head of the Secretariat of the faction of one of the political parties in the Verkhovna Rada reported the approval of the proposal of the MoD on the implementation of the experimental project of attracting air defense groups (hereinafter – GPPO), after which one of the people’s deputies published as if the preliminary order of regulation of the said pilot project (hereinafter – Order).
So is the idea of depriving the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of the Air Force on Air Defense Progressive decision or “people’s air defense” will cause more harm than benefits?
First of all is worth a briefly described The innovation is proposed.
Yes, it is proposed to create air defense groups in DFTG to destroy air threats. Who will be able to become a member of the air defense group is not explicitly stated, but according to the deputies “among them servicemen, DFTG members and non -mobilization citizens.” Also:
- The sources of financing will be state and local budgets, as well as the United 24 Foundation;
- The GPO will be formed on a territorial principle within the local DFTG at the initiative of the military administration, and will be subordinate to local TRO;
- In this case, persons in the GPO can not perform any tasks except for air protection;
- Members of the GPPO Air Defense Groups can use their own property, including small-scale hunting weapons, unmanned unmanned and, Lord-strokes, manned aircraft;
- The GPO participants are given financial security up to UAH 100,000 in proportion to the time during which they were involved in the performance of duties;
- The accounting is maintained by the GPO commander and is provided by the report of the commander of the relevant unit TRO.
Although the risks of creating such “air-to-air folk turtle” are noticeable to the naked legal education of the eye, it is advisable to describe them in detail.
Disadvantages of the deployment procedure:
The GPO units will be created on a territorial basis and will be provided by local administrations, the question of the algorithm of their deployment.
Yes, obviously the need for Sumy or Kharkiv region in the GPO groups is higher than in Bukovina. Therefore, whether the relocation of such groups, deployed in the west of the country, is closer to the line of fighting or DCU. In such circumstances, will the obligation to provide “overturned” groups will rely on the place of their primary deployment, or in the areas in which they will act? In the second case, the conditional Chernihiv region is obliged to provide the GPO with a dozen areas with its own resources, if not – the Chernivtsi Ova in somehow has to send weapons and fuel for 700 kilometers in conditional Chernihiv in sufficient quantity and promptly.
Risk of Effective Support:
The Open Open Test provides for the GPO financial support through local budgets, the United 24 Foundation and the Dezhudjet. Diversification on the one hand is rational: yes, funds and local budgets are limited in the purchase of some ammunition (especially those that are removed from civil circulation). Although Art. 15 of the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Status, and gives the military administration the powers “to ensure in the conditions of martial law of the realization of state guarantees”, but this is obviously not about the purchase of missiles-interceptors, so the state budget and central bodies will come to the rescue.
But with diversification, providing raises the question of liability in case of fact. Yes, in case of lack of fuel for tasks, who will respond to the incapacity of the group – the central state authority or the manager of local budgets, can the Foundation “United 24”? Is it not a means of pressure if one of the GPOs “impartially” reports its failure to provide it with the fault of local authorities?
Missance of Legal Regulation:
Open sources are known to be that the GPO groups will include non -servicemen or even DFTG members. Considering the “usual” arsenal of the mobile fire group – large -caliber machine guns, anti -aircraft guns and MAS – whether civilians will be accessible to such weapons that are completely removed from civilian turnover.
Even having settled access to Browning students and plumbers – operational logistics and ammunition storage. Obviously storage of machine -gun tape in the apartment is a crime under Part 1 of Art. 263 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. At the same time, if the ammunition will be stored in the weapon room of the TRO, it completely eliminates any efficiency: after announcing the alarm, the person goes into his car, goes into part, stands in the queue of other GPOs, receives under the signature of weapons, and then goes to the border-the time of deployment is long.
Risks of interaction and friendly fire:
According to the text of the order, the GPOs will be able to use unmanned and manned aircraft, their own hunting weapons, etc.
However, in these circumstances, P Interaction between the GPOs and other components of air defense, especially if the groups plan to lift into the sky during the reflection of their own unmanned and piloted aviation.
A relevant negative example of “People’s air defense” is the beating “Baracter” May 5, 2023 over Kiev, in which everything was fired. Then, for example, the NSU fire training instructor and the arms expert Taras Oliynyk indicated that thousands of balls of different UAV calibers were not knocked down (and physically knock down the objects at an altitude of several kilometers), but released ammunition fell somewhere and only miraculously killed anyone.
Corruption risks:
The amount of financial security and not too determined reporting of the GPO creates a risk of corruption, when the TRO officer “accidentally” forms groups of persons who agree not to perform duties, but to share the financial support, fictitiously “written” fuel and ammunition – everything is “tied” to the military.
Thus, although increasing the efficiency of air defense is existential, fortunately, its development continues permanently. At the same time, the described experimental project now looks like an attempt to shift the responsibilities of the shakhs of “shahas” hunters, because access to the public space, providing and attracting the NAPO in the public space to perform combat missions, condemns them to the fate of disorganized shooters, whose brows will not be killed.
Vladimir Romanchuk
A column is a material that reflects the author’s point of view. The text of the column does not claim the objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic that rises in it. The editorial board of “Ukrainian Truth” is not responsible for the accuracy and interpretation of the information provided and plays only the role of the carrier. The point of view of the UP editorial board may not coincide with the point of view of the author of the column.