Ayeatal barrier screens as a means of fighting against Russian shared terror

“Drones are like artillery of the 21st century: they are cheap, massive, deadly and accessible to even poor countries.”

Peter Suhan

War of drones Any war is a engine of technological progress. A peculiar symbol of the First World War was the British Tank of Mark I, which was first used during the battle on the Somma River in Northern France. The Second World War caused an even greater breakthrough in the technical means of war. From mass production of armored vehicles and aircraft to the first prototypes of ballistic missiles and radars, which marked a new era of radar struggle. But the main symbol of technological progress was definitely the development and use of atomic bomb, which determined for centuries the further nature of armed conflict.

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The Russian-Ukrainian war, as the military historian Mikhail Zhirokhov noted the war, became the war of drones. That is, the main result of technological progress was the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles as a means of damage and their modification during this war.

September 2022, the Aggressor’s troops began to actively use the Shahd-136 drones, which were produced in Iran, against Ukraine. Over time, the Russians transferred the production of this type of drones to their territory, scaling it under the marking of Gerani-2. According to analysts, the main production is in the Republic of Tatarstan and now Russia can produce up to 70 spiral drones a day.

At the same time, the aggressor has already modified this type of drone-Kamikadze in the Shahd-238 reactive drone (geranium-3), which develops speeds up to 600 km/h. The new drone at speed is three times higher than the speed of the screw analogues. It is difficult to disagree with the American military analyst Frank Hoffman who notes that “drones change not only tactics but also the logic of war – they blur the line between the soldier and the civilian, the front and the rear.”

Thus, during the period of aggression, Russian troops scale up their own production of spiral drones-Kamikadze, changed the tactics of their use and achieved the modification of this type of damage. This leads to more and more massive terrorist attacks on the rear cities and infrastructure facilities in Ukraine. For example, on June 1, 2025, the use of UAV during an air attack was the use of an aggressor of 472 drones, and already on the night of July 8 to 9, 2025, 728 Shahmed was used in one departure of the Russian attack against Ukraine. Trends indicate that the Russians will soon be used against Ukraine with UAVs of 1000 units. Autumn promises to be difficult.

Anatoly Amelin notes that the transition from screw to jet drones dramatically changes the tactical equation: Ukrainian mobile air defense groups, which effectively knock down slow Shahd-136 from machine guns and MAZRCs, are practically powerless against the goals flying at the speed of the World War II.

It can also be stated that the enemy is constantly adapting to the operation of our air defense system. Recently, the enemy has changed the tactics for the use of shock UAVs, taking into account the range of effective machine guns that use mobile fire groups. The enemy raised the edge of the UAV flight to 3.5 km, thereby reducing the effectiveness of their damage by mobile air defense groups.

These circumstances require the improvement of the domestic air defense system with the use of decisions that would be effective and at the same time cheap. It is for the purpose of adaptation to the challenges of the modern drone war that Ukrainian military is already used by domestic production drones. On June 11, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers on June 11, 2025 adopted a resolution on the strengthening of air defense of the territory of Ukraine by attracting air defense groups to expand the arsenal. This should allow you to create air defense groups on the basis of DFTG by attracting private light -motor aircraft to combat UAVs.

No type of active air defense is capable of providing full suppression of massive air strikes. The volume of air goals released, their technical characteristics require our country to diversify the air defense system.

In this war, the old approaches to war and the latest technologies are strangely combined. The past is faced with the future. An example of this is the construction of “net tunnels” near the line of combat collision, which provides protection for equipment from strokes of enemy UAVs. In its report on this phenomenon, the New York Times came to an important conclusion: “Using nets – a vivid manifestation of the paradox of this war: old, simple remedies are often the best protection against the latest technologies.”

Following this logic, we propose to use the experience of “British Battle” in the Second World War, diversifying the domestic air defense by a passive type of protection – balloons.

The role of balloons in the battle for Britain Having conquered the European continent in 1940, Hitler decided to carry out the Air War against Britain, thinking that this demonstration would be enough to force the British to surrender and compromise. Developed by the Nazi Military Operation “Maritime Lion” was considered too risky in the absence of full control over the airspace of Britain and La Mansh.

Only two episodes will be enough to understand the intensity of fascist bombers in Britain. From September 7 to November 3, 1940, for 57 nights, every night about 200 bombers attacked London.

During the coating raid on November 14, 1940, German troops used almost 500 aircraft, which dropped 600 tons of fugas and thousands of inflammatory bombs into the city. However, the aircraft engine and the machine -building plant did not stop working.

To conduct this Air Battle, Britain has created a branched air defense system. Thus, on November 1, 1938, a balloon command of the royal Air Force was created, which was responsible for the control and activity of all units of barrier balloons. During the raids of fascist troops in London, up to 2,000 balloons could hang in the sky above the British capital.

The barrows are large balloons that were widely used to prevent the low span of German bombers. Technologically, they were filled with hydrogen or helium, tied to the ground, towers, trucks, ships with a thick steel rope, in fact, which prevented hostile planes to fly at low altitude.

The balloons were widely used to protect large cities, especially London, Coventry (powerful industrial center), Liverpool (port city), as well as individual strategic sites: military bases, fuel warehouses, energy and infrastructure.

This kind of passive defense forced German bombers to pretend I am to maneuvers to bypass the areas of balloon, to rise higher, where the anti -aircraft fire or fighter jets of the royal air forces could be conducted on them, and in general affected the target of bombing.

Ayeatal barrier screens in the fight against Shahmed In the face of the present war, the balloons and ropes that they lift into the air will be ineffective in the fight against the Shahaned bombers much smaller than the bombers. However, by modifying this type of passive defense, complementing it with antitrone nets with suspended elements with the use of explosives, chains and other means that can damage UAVs – this can significantly diversify and strengthen the Ukrainian air defense system.

Aystartic barrel screens can be part of the protection against the threat of impact UAVs of both large rear cities and individual critical objects. In addition, the balloon itself is an artificial cloud that prevents air intelligence from conducting an enemy.

Advantages of the balloon system of barrier screens:

Cheapness. The complex of ballooning screens is much cheaper than other types of active protection. The cost of beating one cheed with aviation by means of $ 150 thousand (MiG-29) to $ 1 million (F-16), and the means of MAZRC-from $ 15 to $ 75 thousand. Instead, budgetary variants of balloon barriers can cost about $ 10,000. Complex militaries (radar balloons) can cost hundreds of millions of $.

Easy to operate. It doesn’t take too much time to train appropriate service groups. It is not necessary to involve professional military.

Sufficient height. Depending on the type of balloon, it can reach 5,000 m. The UAVs are currently raised to a height of 4,000 m.

Passive defense without loss of own pilots. The balloon is practically not at risk of our people, provided that the Air Force forces are properly coordinated and coordinated.

Adaptability. They can be equipped with explosive elements for the neutralization of drones, sensors, cameras, sensors, radio -electronic fighting systems, which in the complex of work with air defense forces will be able to help in detecting air targets.

Local variability. It can be used to protect individual areas, such as UAVs to major cities, or for the subject to protect critically important locations.

Financial support. The possibility of attracting various sources of financing: state, local budgets, business funds and contributions of individuals, as well as assistance in the supply of components of the system from foreign partners.

Reduction of air defense. The interception of at least some of the percussion UAVs by means of aerated barrier screens will significantly reduce the load on aviation, MAGs, mobile firing groups.

Mobility. The possibility of unimpeded rapid change of location of the use of this type of passive protection.

Data collection means. More complex types of militaristic balloons, or those that will be supplemented by the relevant elements, are able to collect in real time data on the operational situation for the movement of enemy goals in the Ukrainian sky.

To effectively introduce a balloon system of barrier screens, you need:

To evaluate needs. Determine areas with the highest attack density, as well as UAV flight trajectory for placing barriers in the area of drones.

Develop a technical solution. Determine the type of balloon, its main characteristics (material, mesh diameter, use of additional equipment).

To carry out the test. Within one of the rear areas, carry out tests in combat conditions of efficiency of the proposed decision and carry out coordination with other types of air defense.

Regulatory support. 1. Develop a projection of the Cabinet resolution by analogy with a resolution on strengthening of air defense of the territory of Ukraine by attracting or complementing air defense groups.

2. To approve the standard solutions of barrier balloons for the formation of aircraft air defense units.

Formation and network deployment of aeronatics units.

Ensure prompt staffing and training of balloon units with the involvement of domestic enterprises for the production of typical aeronics barrier screens.

Network deployment of balloon units on the principles: object (critical infrastructure, large cities, logistics nodes, etc.) and zonal (formation of balloon lines of barriers in the directions of probable UAV penetration into the Ukrainian airspace).

This war brings to the fore the principle of “change or dream.” We need to adapt to new, constantly changing external conditions and tactics of fighting by the aggressor. The Russians expect to break our will to resistance, increasing the intensity of shelling with UAVs. No illusions are required. Autumn will be difficult and we immediately need to modify the air defense system, enhancing our capabilities. Time is short for this.

The Russians learn and improve in their desire to kill. Death is the only thing the Russian system is. Once death will come after them, destroying this anti -human criminal structure, and by that moment we need to keep our defense and methodically close the death of Rashism. Sometimes old remedies are the best protection against new threats. So why not use a means of protection from the twentieth century in the fight against bombers of the 21st century?

Alexei Buslik, Candidate of Law, Expirer of the Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, Expert

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