“Now, for Ukrainian society and authorities, a number of internal and external challenges have converged at the same time. We have an internal political crisis caused by anti-corruption investigations and a “peace plan” originally written for us and without us. Added to this is the extremely difficult situation in the energy sector caused by Russian shelling of civilian infrastructure.”, — write: www.pravda.com.ua
We thank and support the extraordinary efforts of our military to hold the front.
The context of living a war in conditions of traditional strategic uncertainty and negotiation chaos exhausts society, and the speed of multidirectional news fuels the mood of social uncertainty.
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Russia has become more active and is actively spreading narratives about “revolutionary upheavals” in Ukraine, outright fakes about the military “situation on the ground”, which is difficult.
Also, the enemy traditionally scares with nuclear escalation: appointed Kremlin analysts calmly analyze the needs of a “preemptive nuclear strike on Europe.” Old blanks about the supposed illegitimacy of the Ukrainian political leadership are also added, and the blame for torpedoing “peace” is usually shifted by Russia to Ukraine. Time is of the essence in conditions of exhaustion and lack of resources.
During the war, Ukrainian society repeatedly demonstrated its ability to adapt to long-term resistance, to life in conditions of constant threats and high uncertainty. This initially surprised both the Ukrainian society itself and those who watched this safe marathon from the outside. Despite the fatigue, the level of social cohesion seems to remain relatively stable even today. Yes, according to survey by KMISconducted in September-October 2025, the majority of respondents (63%) believe that Ukrainians are overcoming contradictions and are on the path to national unity. 30% of those who, on the contrary, are convinced that internal contradictions are deepening and Ukrainians are heading for a split.
At the same time, the current risks are far from the “point of no return”, because the main “pillar” of stability remains the Defense Forces and society.
Every Ukrainian family already has the experience of living in war and adapting to its realities. As military psychologist Oleg Pokalchuk noted recently, fatigue and a decline in enthusiasm in a long war are natural for any nation, there is no “special Ukrainian magic” here. It is more important that despite this fatigue, and sometimes despair, Ukrainians have learned to adapt to crisis conditions and new circumstances that have arisen under the influence of threats, as well as to transform negative results into positive ones, not only to survive, but also to move on.
It is equally important that our fellow citizens are convinced of the unity of society, perceive it as a value and an advantage. However, the “internal reserves” of society’s stability alone are not enough to continue in this war of attrition. Appropriate actions and decisions of the authorities are needed. Moreover, in all spheres which, so to speak, are “sag”. From an effective policy to support IDPs to strategic communications that could at least partially neutralize Russia’s activity in the cognitive war.
At the same time, public attitudes are becoming more sensitive to informational influences. Often, Ukrainians receive important messages about the contours of international discussions or the structures of agreements on a “peace agreement” not from Ukrainian state institutions, but from materials of foreign media or public statements of partners, anonymous telegram channels or social media. Such asymmetry in communication creates the basis for misunderstandings and speculation, especially in matters related to potential negotiations.
This challenge is exacerbated by the domestic context — unprecedented corruption scandals and fluctuations in trust in institutions make it difficult to make any decisions. In a situation where the country is in a war for survival, at least some communication predictability also becomes a component of social stability. It is not about revealing the content of the negotiating positions, but about the presence of clear, stable channels for explaining the general framework: which topics can be the subject of discussion, and which are fundamentally excluded.
The need for such communication is also growing because Ukraine is forced to act in an environment of constant strategic uncertainty. The partners’ positions on long-term support remain out of sync: some countries declare their intention to continue aid, for which we are grateful, while others avoid specifics regarding terms, volumes or clear guarantees. This creates additional pressure both on the political leadership and on society, which has to navigate in conditions where external parameters change slowly and sometimes inconsistently.
The question of whether Ukraine will win a just peace for itself, or at least a partially just one, remains more than relevant. And what it should be. What are the bifurcation points, the red lines here? In international discussions, it is important to preserve the basic principle, which is also emphasized by European partners: the aggressor cannot be rewarded – neither with territory nor with political concessions that will create dangerous precedents in the future for other regions and countries.
Any settlement formula must include guarantees of providing resources for continued resistance, deterring the aggressor, compensation mechanisms for the damage caused, and protection of the rights of people affected by aggression. A departure from these conditions would open the way to renewed aggression and violence and would undermine confidence in the international security system, which is already more than tattered by the Russian war.
With a very high probability, the likely unjust peace, which involves the compulsion to give up de jure territories, the refusal to implement responsibility for war crimes, the limitation of sovereignty, will lead not only to the creation of an unstable buffer zone, but also to an increase in socio-political divisions and conflicts, a worsening of the economic situation, and an increase in criminal threats. And such destabilization will be beneficial for the Russian Federation and the forces that support it.
By the way, in the Russian Federation, which wants to continue the war and avoid the effect of American sanctions, Kremlin propagandists spread the view of the peace agreement not so much in the context of the values of the 20th century, but of the 17th and 18th centuries. This refers to the period of the “Russian-Turkish wars”, when there was a long process of approving the imperial borders, and not a victory in one battle, “not according to the logic of a one-time final victory.” Therefore, peace agreements with a significant weakening of Ukraine and the EU will be needed by the current leadership of the Russian Federation for further options for multidirectional expansion and militarization.
Therefore, maintaining the cohesion of Ukrainian society and the willingness of the authorities to carry out honest “work on mistakes” is not only our internal matter.
We have to realize, I a lot depends on whether Ukraine will emerge from the political crisis in the near future and whether we will be able to correctly set priorities in these extremely difficult times.
Yulia Tyshchenko
A column is a type of material that reflects exclusively the point of view of the author. It does not claim objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic in question. The point of view of the editors of “Economic Pravda” and “Ukrainian Pravda” may not coincide with the author’s point of view. The editors are not responsible for the reliability and interpretation of the given information and perform exclusively the role of a carrier.