One of the loudest anti-corruption operations of the year was supposed to be perceived as a demonstration of strength. Instead, it became an indicator of systemic problems that had accumulated over the years, UNN reports.

An escape that overturned the narrativeWhen businessman Timur Mindich, a key figure in a high-profile energy case, freely left Ukraine through the official border, the public effect was the opposite of what was expected. NABU and SAPO announced an “unprecedented operation.” But the very fact that it ended with the escape of the main suspect undermined trust more than any political statements.

According to information from investigators and prosecutors, including former SAPO prosecutor Stanislav Bronytskyi, in addition to border alerts, such operations are almost always accompanied by physical surveillance. In high-profile cases, investigators maintain control over the suspect until the moment a suspicion is announced to avoid the risk of their departure. In Mindich’s case, this did not happen. 

NABU head Semen Kryvonos explained the absence of a border alert by the desire to avoid information leaks. But this argument only intensified the questions. Even in the event of a possible leak, it would have been much more difficult for Mindich to leave the country.

As a result, the public received not an answer, but a new dilemma: is it a failure of operational work, or an intentional creation of a “window of opportunity” for Mindich and for what purpose?

Suspicion crumbling on detailsIn the legal community, the quality of Mindich’s suspicion raised no fewer questions than his escape. Lawyers describe the document as underdeveloped and legally fragile.

The main claims are: the suspicion refers to the legalization of illegal proceeds, but their origin is not described, i.e., there is no predicate; episodes related to corruption in “Energoatom” do not contain a direct connection to Mindich; a significant part of the statements are based on assumptions, not evidence.

A separate topic was the discrepancy in the amounts announced by various sources. In the first days of the operation, NABU Director Semen Kryvonos announced 100 million dollars that passed through the office of the “criminal organization.” Later, Mindich’s suspicion was published, which already referred to a total amount of “criminal funds” of 311 million UAH, and in court, a third figure is now being heard – 145 million UAH. 

Political context that fueled skepticismThe media explosion of this case coincided with a period of intensified diplomatic negotiations between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia regarding the end of the war. Some experts suggested that NABU and SAPO might have had political motives for weakening President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the information space. There is no direct evidence of this, but the very fact that such interpretations appeared indicates that trust in the anti-corruption infrastructure has become so low that any high-profile step by the anti-corruption system is viewed through a political lens.

Cases that never became successful successesMindich’s story is not unique. Alongside it is a whole series of major cases that have not yielded tangible results over the years:

• “Ukrgasvydobuvannya” of Oleksandr Onyshchenko: some episodes closed, figures avoided convictions, Onyshchenko himself abroad;

• the case of former minister Volodymyr Omelyan – HACC acquitted the former minister;

• “Rotterdam+” — years of investigations without convictions despite the resonance;

• the Svinarchuk (Hladkovskyi) case: a high-profile case during the 2019 presidential elections, but not completed;

• the Mykola Martynenko case regarding corruption in “Energoatom”: ongoing for the tenth year without a verdict;

• the case against former infrastructure minister Andriy Pyvovarskyi – also closed.

This list can be continued for a long time, which forms a risky trend: a loud start and almost complete absence of a logical and, most importantly, legal finale.

Agreements with the investigation and the closed nature of the processesFormer SAPO prosecutor Stanislav Bronytskyi, who left the specialized prosecutor’s office after the scandalous agreement between SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko and businessman Borys Kaufman, became one of the public critics of the internal management of anti-corruption bodies. It is in the leadership that the former prosecutor sees the root of all existing problems, and not in the bodies themselves.

He tells the story of his case concerning the Odesa International Airport. Despite the existence of significant evidence, the head of SAPO signed an agreement with suspect Kaufman instead of sending the case to court.

Under the agreement, the state was to receive only half of Kaufman’s allegedly illegal profit from the activities of Odesa Airport, namely 1 billion UAH, and the airport itself remained in his private orbit. The agreement was classified, which further increased distrust. Bronytskyi emphasizes: the most dangerous trend is closed agreements adopted without public control. In his opinion, they become an instrument not of fighting corruption, but of peaceful settlement of interests between influential businessmen, NABU detectives, and SAPO prosecutors.

It should be added that, according to sources, cases of backroom agreements between business and anti-corruption officials have indeed occurred repeatedly, and all these contacts are currently being checked.

Bronytskyi also draws attention to how anti-corruption bodies are reluctant to investigate cases concerning their former or current colleagues, in particular, he mentions the story of Dmytro Verbytskyi, dismissed after scandals with illegal enrichment from the position of Deputy Prosecutor General during Andriy Kostin’s tenure. For a year and a half, says Bronytskyi, there has been no clear information about the progress of the investigation.

He himself indicates that Verbytskyi has a powerful patron in NABU, namely Borys Indychenko, head of the detective unit (D2) in NABU.

A systemic crisis that is no longer hiddenThe Mindich case was supposed to be proof of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption infrastructure. Instead, it revealed its weaknesses: insufficient control over the figures, poor evidentiary base, contradictory media messages, political motives, closed agreements, and possible political influence.

Another dimension of the crisis: the role of public organizations that have become an integral part of the anti-corruption ecosystem. It is they who often participate in the formation of government bodies, assess the integrity of candidates, delegate experts to competition commissions, and influence the choice of leaders of key institutions. Formally, this was supposed to strengthen transparency, but in practice, it turned out that they advocate, attract, and cover for “their own.”

Can these competitions truly be impartial if the participants in the process are financed from the same donor sources and work in a closely related professional orbit – this is precisely what became, in particular, the subject of an audit by the Temporary Investigative Commission in parliament, headed by People’s Deputy Serhiy Vlasenko.

Skepticism intensified after the high-profile scandal with the selection of appellate court judges. Organizations that were supposed to monitor the integrity of judges themselves found themselves at the center of doubts about their own integrity: from opaque evaluation methods to internal conflicts of interest. 

As a result, society saw a paradox: those who were supposed to be the foundation of the updated system found themselves in a situation where trust in them turned out to be no less shaky than in the state institutions they are called upon to purify.