“Story that should not have happened: how modernized helicopters lost their armament due to Soviet standardsA story that should not have happened: how modernized helicopters lost their armament due to Soviet standards.
”, — write: unn.ua
Technology from the past that holds the presentFor over ten years, the Ukrainian military has been fighting with equipment inherited from the Soviet Union. Despite their age, Mi-8 helicopters, BMPs, tanks, and other weapons remain the core of the army’s combat potential. With the start of the full-scale invasion, their importance has only grown. Everything that flies, drives, and shoots is literally worth its weight in gold.
But for this equipment to remain in service, it needs not just to be maintained – but systematically updated: repaired, re-equipped, adapted to modern combat. This includes communications, targeting, protection systems – critical components without which even a powerful platform loses combat effectiveness.
This is especially true for army aviation, which performs the most dangerous tasks, which, according to the words of the Commander of Army Aviation of Ukraine of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Pavlo Bardakov, are very broad – from supporting ground units, medical evacuation, cargo delivery to air defense tasks. In one interview, he also noted that Ukraine is not even considering abandoning Soviet equipment at the moment.
“There is no such thought as to refuse. How can we refuse? F-16s have arrived, Mirages have arrived. Everyone still works together. And MiG-29s, Su-27s. Everyone flies. Because there will be no fewer tasks,” Bardakov noted.
And for helicopters to be not just in the sky, but to operate effectively – a comprehensive restoration of their combat systems is necessary. But this task is complex not only technically. The shortage of original spare parts, military logistics, constant changes in the regulatory field, unstable financing – all this creates a vicious circle.
In such conditions, finding those willing to undertake the most complex equipment is rare.
Contracts on the verge of the possibleAmong the few companies that undertake the modernization of outdated aviation equipment, the Ukrainian company LLC NPF “MS AVIA-GRADE” occupies a special place. It specializes in the deep modernization of Mi-8 combat helicopters, which are indispensable for army aviation and perform dozens of combat missions daily – often literally on the verge of the possible.
In December 2022, at the request of army aviation, a contract was concluded between the state and “MS AVIA-GRADE” for the modernization of ten units of aviation equipment. The main emphasis was placed on restoring weapon systems so that helicopters could again perform combat missions.
However, in March 2023, due to limited funding, the contract was revised – six helicopters were excluded from it. Despite the reduction in volume, the company maintained its obligations for the remaining four machines. Work began in July 2023 after advance payment, and by the end of November, the modernization of three helicopters was completed. The fourth machine, due to force majeure circumstances, was handed over to the customer in December.
In parallel, in November 2023, another contract was concluded with “AVIA-GRADE” – this time for the restoration of armaments of five more Mi-8MT/MTV helicopters. The reason was a repeated purchase for those units of equipment that were previously excluded from the initial agreement. All work was successfully completed by July 30, 2024, after which the helicopters were handed over to the operators.
Helicopters without weapons: how technical confusion turned combat modernization into a threat to the armyTwo Mi-8MT helicopters, whose modernization was discussed in the previous block, found themselves at the center of a conflict that threatened not only their combat readiness but also trust in the mechanisms of technical cooperation in the defense sector.
Both machines underwent deep modernization at the facilities of “MS Avia-Grade” – weapon systems, protection, onboard electronics, beam holder farms, as well as ADROS KT and KUV complexes, which provide protection against guided missiles, were installed on them. The equipment was purchased through Prozorro, complied with current Ukrainian legislation, and passed military acceptance. One of the helicopters successfully flew over 80 hours in combat conditions without any technical remarks, the other was on combat duty.
After exhausting their inter-repair resource, both helicopters were handed over for major overhaul work.
“The helicopters were handed over for major overhaul to obtain a new inter-repair resource: 2,000 hours or 8 years of operation. According to the contract, we bear warranty obligations for our equipment,” representatives of “MS AVIA-GRADE” noted. That’s when a new, unexpected phase of the story began.
The performing company was not allowed to participate in the claim process, despite the fact that it was responsible for the warranty obligations for the installed equipment. During the repair process, without its participation, combat equipment was dismantled, including beam farms for armaments, which are crucial for performing combat missions.
“If the company that performed the previous repair or modernization of equipment is excluded from the technical inspection process, a number of serious risks arise. Firstly, trace information is lost – the contractor has data on the repair technology, replaced units, serial numbers of aggregates, and previously identified issues. Secondly, the context for assessing operational damage may be lost,” “MS AVIA-GRADE” also emphasized.
Even more alarming is the fact that during the assessment of dismantled components, Soviet and Russian “GOSTs” were applied instead of current Ukrainian standards. Due to this comparison, modern Ukrainian components were deemed non-compliant. This became the basis for criminal proceedings and the arrest of key equipment – in the midst of the war.
“Our equipment was compared not with current documentation, but with old Russian GOSTs. For example, to explain in simple terms, a conditional nut from an assembly kit with a height of 5 mm is provided for in our current design documentation and DSTU documentation, approved in 2023. But for them – a nut with a height of 10 mm, because it is a Soviet and Russian standard. Because of this, it was concluded that the parts are “inauthentic.” If such criteria are used, almost any modern modernization can be questioned,” explained “MS Avia-Grade.”
The company also emphasized that it repeatedly appealed to the customer, the operating organization, and the enterprise that performed the major overhaul of the aircraft with a demand to provide them with access to their own equipment to fulfill warranty obligations. However, they did not receive any permission for this. As a result, the company cannot protect its reputation, and the helicopters remain without key armament elements.
The situation seems paradoxical: two helicopters that underwent modernization, worked out their combat resource, and successfully performed tasks, as a result of major overhaul, may return to the army in a worse technical condition than before the repair – without armaments.
This is not just a technical error – it is a loss of combat capabilities during a critical period for the country. The deadline for major overhaul and return of the aircraft in combat-ready condition expired on June 30, 2025. Currently, there is no confirmation of the full combat capability of the helicopters being restored.
UNN sent a number of information requests to various institutions, including the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, to find out what exactly happened to these combat vehicles. However, at the time of publication, the editorial office had not received any response.
Conclusions: Modernizing does not mean winningThis story is a symptom of deeper, systemic problems that threaten the army’s combat capability in a full-scale war.
On the one hand – the efforts of Ukrainian manufacturers who take responsibility for complex modernization projects, invest resources, participate in public tenders, and work for results. On the other hand – a lack of interaction between institutions, inconsistency of technical regulations, admission to work without the manufacturer, and finally – an absurd situation when modern Ukrainian equipment is evaluated according to the standards of Soviet Russia.
As a result, combat equipment, instead of being strengthened, undergoes disarmament. And those who undertook the modernization – through criminalization.
Against the backdrop of the front’s acute need for weapons and equipment, Ukraine cannot afford such losses. This is not just a management error. This is a direct risk for the defenders who rely on effective aviation, and for everyone who expects the strengthening of defense capabilities.
The main question remains open: will the system be able to draw conclusions and move from internal contradictions to a common goal, where the priority will be not form, but result, not bureaucracy, but combat capability?