Does fighting corruption cost Ukraine more than corruption itself? Figures and cases from the NABU report

Funding of the anti-corruption bloc — NABU, NACP, SAPO and HACC — costs Ukraine almost UAH 4 billion per year, and these expenses are steadily growing. However, the real economic effect in 2024 was less than UAH 1 billion. This is evidenced by the official data of NABU, reports UNN.

DetailsAccording to the NABU report, in 2024, as a result of the Bureau’s activities, it was possible to return about UAH 960 million to the budget (NABU report). At the same time, the total costs of maintaining NABU, SAPO, NACP and HACC for the same period amounted to about UAH 4 billion. That is, expenses are four times higher than the economic result.

NABU’s calculations also include seized assets, but seizure is only an intermediate stage of the process, not a real return of funds to the state. Therefore, the only objective assessment is the actual receipt of funds lost due to corruption into the budget.

Controversial casesJournalistic investigations show that a significant part of the sentences relate to minor offenses, not top-level corruption. One example is the case against a member of the HQCJ for illegally accruing salary allowances. Experts draw attention to the potential conflict of interest, as NABU and SAPO have an institutional influence on the formation of the HQCJ, which casts doubt on the impartiality of the investigation. A similar situation was previously observed with the High Council of Justice.

Questions about the property of detectivesAccording to the NACP, individual NABU detectives have declared millions of hryvnias in cash, elite real estate and cars in recent years. Investigations also mention the facts of using crypto wallets to hide income.

This includes, in particular, NABU senior detective Oleksandr Rykovtsev, detective Stanislav Braverman, and Oleksandr Moiseev. However, the NACP has not officially checked the declarations of NABU detectives and management. The lack of any reaction to the scandals raises questions about the transparency of the anti-corruption control system itself.

ContextNABU, SAPO and HACC were created in 2015 with the active participation of the United States and international donors to combat top-level corruption. However, in recent years, their effectiveness has significantly decreased: high-profile cases do not reach the court for years or end in suspended sentences. One striking example is the case of businessman Eduard Samotkal, who was put on the wanted list back in 2017. It still remains without a final, which raises questions, in particular due to Samotkal’s connections with the family of NABU Director Semen Kryvonos. Or the case of ex-Minister Volodymyr Omelyan, whom NABU accused of losses to the state, and HACC acquitted.

According to experts, the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) remains the most vulnerable link in the anti-corruption bloc. Experts draw attention to the fact that HACC judges are often forced to consider cases around which a powerful information pressure is formed even before the start of the trial. Activists, as well as representatives of NABU and SAPO, publicly comment on the proceedings, suggesting the guilt of the defendants, which potentially violates the principle of presumption of innocence.

According to lawyers, this is what explains the significant number of acquittals by HACC. In such cases, according to experts, the amount of procedural violations and inadmissible evidence is so significant that the court actually has no grounds for issuing convictions. At the same time, HACC is currently experiencing a staffing crisis: the first instance has a third of vacant judge positions, and the appeal has almost half.

Interference in the independence of HACC judges: the case of Judge TkachenkoRecently, there have been increasing cases of public pressure on judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) by public organizations close to the anti-corruption bloc. This has become especially noticeable in cases where court decisions do not coincide with the expectations of NABU, SAPO or individual activists. An example is the situation surrounding HACC Judge Oleh Tkachenko.

In the public space, criticism was voiced against him for decisions that, according to opponents, are “doubtful”. This includes: partial cancellation of suspicion against People’s Deputy Oleksandr Odarchenko, who was later sentenced in absentia by HACC to 8 years in prison; refusal to apply a preventive measure in the form of detention to ex-People’s Deputy Maksym Mykytas; change of decision regarding the terms of the investigation in the case of Ihor Kolomoisky; release from custody of Yaroslav Luhovyi in the same case.

In addition to decisions in specific cases, individual activists publicly accused Judge Tkachenko of allegedly not complying with the standards of judicial ethics due to his personal statements outside the courtroom.

In February 2025, the second disciplinary chamber of the High Council of Justice (the same one that the anti-corruption bloc has influence on) applied a sanction to Judge Tkachenko in the form of a warning based on a complaint from the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.

The claims concerned, in particular, the slowing down of the consideration of a number of criminal proceedings. However, only 19 cases out of more than 70 that the prosecutors claimed became the subject of disciplinary proceedings. At the same time, it is worth considering that delays in the consideration of cases have objective reasons: due to the staff shortage and excessive workload on HACC judges, who are forced to consider a large number of proceedings, often prepared with procedural flaws by detectives and prosecutors, which, in particular, stated international auditors.

It is worth noting that the current legislation guarantees judges independence in making decisions and prohibits any pressure on them. The adoption of acquittals or changes in preventive measures is a legitimate judicial practice that should be assessed in the legal field, and not through the prism of political or public expectations. Criticism of court decisions is permissible in a democratic society. However, the systematic information persecution of judges for making “unfavorable” decisions poses a threat to the principle of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.

International aspectNABU was created under direct political and financial pressure from the Barack Obama administration (Democrat) and with the support of USAID, NDI and other projects. This is part of the US “soft power” strategy. At the same time, Donald Trump and Republicans are traditionally skeptical of such projects and may significantly revise the policy of supporting Ukraine.

In particular, funding for anti-corruption bodies through USAID has already been stopped, and the appointment of a new US Ambassador to Ukraine is also expected. Without international funding, NABU will be forced to either reform or lose its influence. Currently, the system shows signs of usurpation of justice: the investigation, prosecution and courts actually act as a single bloc, to which they are trying to add advocacy and judicial self-government bodies.

NABU Audit: Another Uncertain Outcome

In 2024, an external audit of NABU’s activities was launched in Ukraine, initiated by international experts with the participation of the government. The audit was to cover the period from March 2023 to November 2024. However, as of April 2025, the final audit report has not been published.

The delay has drawn criticism from the legal community and the public, as the audit was limited to a specific period, while some experts insist on a full review of NABU’s activities since its inception in 2015.

The commission approved a methodology for assessing in five areas: detection and investigation of high-level corruption, integrity, accountability, resource management and international cooperation. However, there are still no real results. This further reinforces doubts about the effectiveness and transparency of NABU’s activities and fuels discussions about the need for a deep reform or a complete reboot of the anti-corruption bloc.

ConclusionIf we imagine the state as a business, and NABU as an internal security department, then the costs of it already exceed the real benefits fourfold. In business, such a structure would be liquidated without hesitation.

In Ukraine, the maintenance of the anti-corruption bloc has been going on for more than 10 years amid rising costs, falling public confidence and attempts to usurp justice. And if earlier funding was supported from outside, USAID, today the budgets of anti-corruptionists are forced to pay only Ukrainians. But sociological surveys show that most Ukrainians do not trust NABU and doubt its effectiveness, and the anti-corruption bloc itself is a leader in anti-trust.