A question of time. How 1,000 days of invasion changed the attitude of Ukrainians to the war, victory and negotiations with the Russian Federation — analysis by NV

On the occasion of 1,000 days of full-scale war, NV reminds us how the opinions of Ukrainians have changed during this time — in particular, about the war and the future of Ukraine.

The information was collected on the basis of the latest available data from sociological surveys — in particular, those in which experts asked Ukrainians the same questions over a long period of time.

Hope for victory

“Do you believe in the victory of Ukraine in the war against Russia?” — this is the question that sociologists of the Razumkov Center have been regularly asking Ukrainians since August 2022.

According to the latest data as of September 2024, a total of 83% of respondents believe in the victory of Ukraine in the war (“yes” or “rather yes”), while in the summer of 2022 this belief was expressed by 91.5%. Especially during this time the number of those who are completely sure of victory has decreased and answers the question in the affirmative “Yes” (from 76.9% in summer 2022 to 60% in autumn 2024).

This indicator was the lowest in June 2024 — against the background of Russia’s attempts to advance on Kharkiv Oblast. Then only 53% responded “yes” to the question about belief in victory, and in general they were inclined to believe in it (along with the answers “rather yes”) 80% of Ukrainians.

What victory is acceptable for Ukraine

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which Russia initially saw as a lightning operation, including the capture of Kyiv, turned into a long and exhausting marathon – both for the aggressor himself and for millions of Ukrainians who are constantly terrorized by the Russian Federation.

During this time, the way Ukrainians tend to see Ukraine’s victory in the war with the Russian Federation has changed significantly. Since the summer of 2022, the Razumkov Center has been monitoring such dynamics in answers to questions about the vision of victory (“What situation would you personally consider a victory in the war?” — for those interviewed who indicated that they believe in the victory of Ukraine).

Here’s how attitudes have changed for a few key scenarios:

• Cessation of the war, even if the Russian army holds on to the territories occupied after February 24, 2022 (Kherson region, Zaporizhzhia region, Donbas): as of September 2024, support for this victory option reached 8.1%, i.e., the maximum value during the observation period. The least Ukrainians agreed with this option of victory was in August 2022 (3.1%) and in December 2022 (3.3%).
• Expulsion of Russian troops behind the line as of February 23, 2022 (separate territories of Luhansk region and Donetsk region and Crimea remain occupied): the rate of those who consider this option of victory acceptable has more than doubled since the summer of 2022 — from 7.4% to 16.6% today.
• Expulsion of Russian troops from the entire territory of Ukraine, except for the occupied Crimea: compared to the first months of the invasion (8.7%), slightly fewer polled are now inclined towards such a scenario of victory (7.5%). This indicator is the smallest (4.2%) was in September-October 2022, when the largest majority of Ukrainians believed in more optimistic options for victory than concessions in Crimea or the occupied territories.
• Expulsion of Russian troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and restoration of borders as of January 2014: at the end of the summer of 2022, despite the recent loss of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, it was this option that was the most popular among all others for the entire period of the study — such a victory scenario was considered acceptable by 54.7% of Ukrainians. Since then, the number of those who count on such a victory option has significantly decreased – to 37.8% (the lowest indicator so far, which can be compared only with January 2024, when it was chosen by 38.1% of respondents). However, this answer still remains the most popular among others, because it is chosen by a relative majority of those Ukrainians who believe in victory.
• Destroying the Russian army and promoting insurrection/disintegration within Russia: 17.5% of respondents who believe in victory now call this the widest option for a final victory for Ukraine as optimal. This is somewhat less than in August 2022, when 20.4% of Ukrainians held this opinion. The highest hopes for a similar scenario of Ukraine’s victory were in February-March 2023 — it was chosen by 30.8% of respondents. Then, despite the hard battles for Bakhmut, the Ukrainians a new counteroffensive of the Defense Forces was expected, Western armored vehicles began to arrive in Ukraine, systematic training of new armed forces brigades abroad was established.
• It is difficult to answer – since the beginning of the invasion, the number of respondents who are not ready to formulate or choose a clear vision of victory has doubled (from 5.3% in the summer of 2022 to 11.1% now).

Infographics: Razumkov Center

Sociologists of the Razumkov Center add that as of the fall of 2024, a relative majority (47%) of Ukrainians believe that permission from Western countries for Ukraine to strike with Western weapons without restrictions on targets on the territory of Russia is more likely to lead to peace in Ukraine than negotiations between Ukraine and Russia (only 29% of respondents consider such negotiations to be a more effective way to achieve peace).

Are negotiations with Russia necessary and when to start them

Another one of the most controversial issues, regarding which Ukrainians had different attitudes in different periods of the invasion, is the expediency of Ukraine’s negotiations with Russia.

Sociologists of the Razumkov Center regularly asked respondents to answer the following question: “There are different opinions regarding negotiations with Russia. Which of these statements do you agree with to a greater extent?”. Respondents were asked to express one of three positions (“yes”, “no”, “difficult to answer”) regarding three possible models of Ukraine’s actions in negotiations with the Russian Federation:

• This is an effective way to achieve peace that should be used now: 16.6% of those surveyed supported this thesis in September-October 2022, since such a question appeared in the surveys of the Razumkov Center. Two years later (as of September 2024 th) the number of those who consider negotiations with the Russian Federation to be an effective and relevant tool for achieving peace has already more than doubled – to 35%. So far, this is the largest number of supporters of negotiations in the 1000 days of the invasion. However, so far the relative majority interviewed (48%) do not agree with the opinion that Ukraine should start negotiations already (in autumn two years ago, 63.7% disagreed.
• Negotiations with Russia should be conducted only after the displacement of its troops to the frontline as of February 23, 2022: those who agree with this thesis and allow negotiations with the Russian Federation without full deoccupation of the sovereign territory of Ukraine also became more. The share of respondents who expressed support for such a position increased from 20.6% in the fall of 2022 to 37% as of the fall of 2024. Instead, the number of opponents of immediate negotiations with the Russian Federation decreased from 59.7% in the first year of the invasion to 41.2% today.
• Negotiations with Russia should be conducted only after displacement (withdrawal) of its troops to the borders as of 1991: Ukraine’s maximum demand and the start of negotiations only after the restoration of its sovereign borders were supported by 57.5% of respondents two years ago, but now their number has decreased to 49.4%. Nevertheless, it is this option that is gaining maximum support compared to others.

Infographics: Razumkov Center

Sociologists also found out that the thesis about the expediency of negotiations with Russia is already supported by a relative majority (48%) residents of the Southern region (do not agree – 37%). Whereas in the Western and Central regions of Ukraine such a position is mostly not supported (57% and 47.5% against, respectively). In the Eastern region, the shares of those who agree to start immediate negotiations with the Russian Federation on the way to peace do not differ statistically significantly (respectively 39% and 43%).

The burden of war and the “strength margin” of Ukrainians

The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology regularly investigates the extent to which Ukrainians themselves are ready to continue bearing the burden of war – in particular, in the question “How much longer are you ready to endure the war?”.

Sociologists of KMIS noticed that during the first two years (from the beginning of the full-scale invasion until February 2024) the situation practically did not change.

About 71-73% of Ukrainians answered that they are ready to endure the war for as long as it takes, and another 2-3% determined their reserve of patience with an interval of about 1 year. In the same period, about a more limited margin of safety (several months to a year and a half) were spoken by 18−21%.

However, in the third year of the war, between February and October 2024, KMIS specialists for the first time recorded a decrease in the share of Ukrainians who are ready to withstand the burden of war as long as necessary.

Infographics: KMIS

Now it is no more than 70%, but still the majority of Ukrainians – 63% – claim that they are ready to endure the war as long as it takes. “At the same time, from 3% to 6%, there was an increase in those who talk about 1 year, that is, 69% of Ukrainians talk about a relatively long period together,” adds KMIS.

They also explain that the share of those who estimate their ability to withstand the war for no more than a few months to half a year has not increased (19% now and 21% in February 2024, which is the difference within the margin of error). “However, those who could not answer the question increased from 4% to 12%, which obviously reflects the general increase in the uncertainty of the future in the eyes of Ukrainians,” KMIS explains.

Should Ukraine join NATO?

In Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s peace plan, which he presented in October 2024, the invitation of Ukraine to NATO is outlined as the first and most important point. After all, joining the Alliance could give the country a chance for reliable protection against future invasions of Russia and its new aggression.

The dynamics of Ukrainian aspirations for NATO membership also became one of the most noticeable changes against the background of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, 75% of Ukrainians would support Ukraine’s entry into the Alliance. This is slightly less than at the peak of such support in 2023 (82% in February of that year), but significantly more than the 58% of respondents who advocated Ukraine’s membership in NATO in the fall of 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

The interviewees were asked to answer the question in the following wording: “If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held today, how would you vote?”

Russia as an absolute enemy

The attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia – the enemy and aggressor, which brought to Ukraine the biggest war in Europe since the Second World War – has become a record for the dynamics of changes during all the years of the war against the Russian Federation.

Experts of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, who have been carefully monitoring the attitude of Ukrainian society towards Russia and Russians for many years, were convinced of this. In particular, KMIS received the latest data in September-October 2024.

In one of the monitoring questions, KMIS sociologists offer respondents to choose one of the options to answer the following question: “How do you generally feel about Russia now?” (options “very good”, “mostly good”, “mostly bad”, “very bad”) are provided.

The graph below shows the generalized dynamics of Ukrainians’ answers to this question during the years 2008-2024 — including almost three years of full-scale invasion. It reflects how the events of the past 16 years have radically changed the attitude of Ukrainians towards the Russian Federation.

“Until February 2014 (inclusive), that is, before the occupation of Crimea, the absolute majority of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia. In the period 2008−2010, on average, 91% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia, in the period 2011−2014 (until February inclusive) — 82%,” KMIS specialists remind.

They emphasize that although the peculiarities of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and the political and economic relations with Russia at that time somewhat worsened the attitude of Ukrainians towards the Russian Federation, however, until February 2014, the absolute majority of Ukrainians (up to 82%) had a good attitude towards Russia. “Which once again proves that the Revolution of Dignity was not anti-Russian in its direction and content. A good attitude towards Russia prevailed in all regions of Ukraine — from the West to the East,” KMIS sociologists emphasize.

The war that Russia started in 2014 and turned into a full-scale war in 2022 changed everything.

“The occupation of Crimea, attempts to destabilize the south and east of Ukraine, and eventually Russia’s resolution of the war in Donbas led to a significant decrease in the share of those who feel good about Russia. The lowest level (until 2022) the indicator reached in May 2015, when 30% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia,” the KMIS analysis shows.

However, even against the background of Russia’s hybrid war, the indicator of attitude towards the Russian Federation began to recover, and in 2019-2022, 54-57% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia. In the future, the attitude began to deteriorate again, and already on the eve of the full-scale invasion of 2022, in February, only 34% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia, while 50% had a bad attitude.

The remnants of the positive attitude of Ukrainians towards the Russian Federation were finally destroyed by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After him, the number of people in Ukraine who can call their attitude towards Russia “good” does not exceed 2−3%.

As of October 2024, shortly before the 1,000-day mark of the invasion, 93% of Ukrainians viewed Russia poorly, while only 3% viewed it favorably.