“How the cognitive war affects Ukraine and the EU, the latest methods of information struggle and protection.”, — write: www.pravda.com.ua
Today there is another front – without trenches and maps. It runs through the news, social media and our decisions – how we understand events and make choices. This is where the struggle for supremacy takes place. IN reports of the Office of the Chief Scientist of NATO it is called cognitive warfare – a targeted influence on the thinking and behavior of civilians and military personnel with the help of informational, psychological and technological tools.
For Ukraine, these are not abstract considerations, but daily experience since 2014. In Europe, it is often considered “Ukrainian specificity”, although in fact it is a universal attack on democracy.
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The war for understanding reality The key target of the cognitive war is the very process of understanding reality. Who forms a picture of the world for us, who do we trust, how do we make sense out of the chaos of events – and how quickly are we able to move from words to decisions.
In the NATO report, this is directly related to the OODA cycle (observe, orient, decide, act) – observe, orient, decide, act. The opponent does not necessarily try to change the final decision. It is enough for him to break the first two stages – observation and orientation – for decisions to become belated, controversial or politically toxic.
This is how Russia works. Before a full-scale invasion, she filled the information space with different, often incompatible explanations of events. Without trying to prove one “truth”, she launched several versions at once: that there will be no attack, that this is a provocation of Ukraine, that it is about an internal conflict, or that the West is exaggerating everything. The goal was simple – to create a fog in which any decision becomes difficult and vulnerable.
Today, the enemy is waging a cognitive war against the army and the civilian population at the same time. They are trying to demoralize the military with fakes about mass surrenders and “catastrophic losses”, civilians – with panic, despair and mistrust of the state. Not only official propaganda channels are involved in this war, but also troll factories, bot farms, media clones, pseudo-experts, fake NGOs and agents of influence that cover the state trail.
For this, the entire arsenal is used – from classic lies and conspiracy theories to coordinated campaigns in social networks, psychological operations and “information siege”. Real problems, such as corruption scandals, blackouts, and war fatigue, are systematically turned into tools for undermining trust. New technologies only increase the effect: microtargeting of disinformation, deepfake videos with “surrenders”, networks of Telegram channels and clones of official pages, as well as cyber attacks and data leaks. The purpose of all this is not to convince, but to exhaust and deprive society of the ability to act quickly and confidently.
Influence is carried out through all channels – from Facebook and X to YouTube, TikTok, traditional media and local chats. Propaganda is disguised as entertainment, “analytics” or rumors, and together it forms a coordinated ecosystem of external information pressure.
Technology as an amplifier of vulnerabilities NATO emphasizes: digital technologies did not create cognitive warfare, but made it faster and more effective. Today, it is not necessary to influence everyone – it is enough to hit the right audience at the right time.
That is why we see a transition from classical propaganda to complex FIMI operations – Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. It is not only about messages, but about networks of bots, cloned media, artificially generated speakers, “content farms” that imitate organic discussion.
Materials of the Center for Strategic Communications systematically describe this logic as information exhaustion: a constant flow of topics that undermine mobilization, sow disillusionment, discredit partners and have a common goal – to convince that resistance is futile. This is the Russian bet: not to win the dispute, but to make society lose its ability to stick to the chosen course.
Ukraine as a laboratory, the EU as a goal Russian information operations in EU countries are not “internal debates” and not a side effect of freedom of speech. This is a well-thought-out strategy aimed at dividing societies, undermining trust in the state and weakening political will.
In the Ukrainian case, the bet is to disrupt defense support. In Europe, it is to make aid to Ukraine a matter of internal enmity, not strategic security. What works today on the Ukrainian audience will be scaled to other democratic societies tomorrow, taking into account their local vulnerabilities.
That is why the Ukrainian experience should sound in Brussels not as a request to “help a little more”, but as a warning for the future.
NATO and Ukraine: different optics of the same war NATO sees cognitive warfare as a long-term systemic challenge: how to protect states’ ability to make decisions, establish inter-agency cooperation, and invest in the resilience of societies in advance. For a union of more than thirty democracies, this is a logical approach.
The Ukrainian approach that I present in my work was formed in the war “here and now”, so it is as practical as possible. Its strengths are flexibility and improvisation: Telegram chats between officials and volunteers, quick experiments.
The state does not monopolize the information struggle – it coordinates, opens channels of interaction and strengthens what is already working effectively in society. NATO is forced to act through the coordinated mechanisms of a large union, which makes its reactions more measured, but less operational in the conditions of a rapid information war.
It is civil society – volunteers, journalists, fact-checkers, experts – that forms a network of trust, which often turns out to be more stable than any centralized system. This is a real model in which the state, the media and active citizens jointly maintain information defense.
Another difference is in the focus of actions. NATO naturally focuses on defense and stability: protecting decision-making processes, reducing the influence of disinformation, and preparing the population. The Ukrainian approach is forced to be broader.
We simultaneously defend (filter enemy content, block channels), respond (counter-propaganda in the occupied territories, mocking the Russian Federation and trolling the occupiers) and try to act in advance (early identify topics on which the enemy is pressing, and be the first to give true information or a positive agenda).
Read also Maria Berlinska’s column: Cognitive technologies. Something that will change the course of the war
What does this mean for NATO and EU policy? The Ukrainian experience gives allies ready-made solutions that should be integrated now, and not after the next crisis.
First, cognitive resilience should be considered as an element of defense on a par with air defense and cyber defense – with a constant assessment of the vulnerabilities of societies and readiness for information crises.
Secondly, NATO and the EU should move from declarations to real cooperation with civil society. Ukrainian experience shows the effectiveness of decentralized their “swarm” models (“beehive”), where journalists, fact-checkers, volunteers and experts work in connection with the state. Such interaction reduces the burden on institutions, increases flexibility and makes information defense more sustainable.
Thirdly, institutionalized cooperation with technological platforms is necessary. Direct and rapid engagement with Big Tech on botnets, coordinated inauthentic behavior and crisis response could form the basis of joint protocols between NATO, the EU and the platforms.
Fourthly, it is worth recognizing that in conditions of existential threat, democratic societies need a special information regime. The Ukrainian experience has shown that temporary tough measures can be acceptable if they are transparent, justified and limited in time. For example, the blocking of Russian media and the restriction of Telegram at the front. For this, NATO and the EU should work out joint response criteria in advance.
Strategic conclusion Cognitive warfare is beneficial to the aggressor, because it is cheap and often invisible, it can have an effect without capturing territories. But it works only where there is internal mistrust, fatigue and division.
In the cognitive war, the one who has the best formulations in the doctrines does not win. The one who learns, adapts and maintains trust within society wins.
Ukraine has already passed this learning curve – at a high price. The only question is whether the Allies are ready to use this experience before the war comes to their homes.
Mykola Balaban
A column is a type of material that reflects exclusively the point of view of the author. It does not claim objectivity and comprehensive coverage of the topic in question. The point of view of the editors of “Economic Pravda” and “Ukrainian Pravda” may not coincide with the author’s point of view. The editors are not responsible for the reliability and interpretation of the given information and perform exclusively the role of a carrier.