“A new approach to military training: why individualized training is more important than a uniform program.”, — write: www.pravda.com.ua
This is what part of our basic military training looks like today: there are tools, there are people, but we do not always use them adequately and effectively.
Recently, a long-awaited decision was made at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: combat brigades will receive a clearly defined number of mobilized men every month. In fact, it is a new approach to the distribution of people between military units even before the start of basic military training (BZVP). Fair distribution, predictability — everything is right. At least in theory, a really necessary and important solution.
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As far as I understand, we are now talking about 37 brigades that have the right to independently conduct BZVP. However, a number of questions still remain before preparation as a whole.
In July of this year, the Ministry of Defense implemented the updated sixth edition of the BZVP program: now it lasts 51 days instead of 45 and contains 402 training hours, of which 367 hours are practical classes. On paper – solid. In fact, it is the same iPhone in the role of a hammer. Because increasing the duration of the program is not equal to increasing the effectiveness of training. The problem is not the duration. The problem is that we once again teach everyone to follow the same pattern, as if they are not people, but the same type of parts on the assembly line. We do not take into account one of the main factors that affects the quality of education – individual characteristics and professional skills of a person.
Today, during the “zero day” implemented within the framework of the BZVP, the mobilized person undergoes an additional medical examination and questionnaire, but then, unfortunately, he merges into the general flow – regardless of who he was in civilian life, what skills, abilities or fears he has. That is, these reviews and questionnaires do not affect the further process of his education.
For example, a mobilized 55-year-old tractor driver will be taught how to work with a 3D printer as much as a 30-year-old IT person who has been using this printer at home for five years and knows it perfectly. And a stress-resistant person will undergo the same psychological training as one who panics at the first shot.
It’s like preparing an assault unit and a platoon of cooks according to a single method. As a result, we spend the same time, but the efficiency is radically different.
Elementary calculation proves: due to the fact that a unified approach is applied to training people, we lose a lot of precious time. We have 51 days of basic combined military training, followed by another 14 days of adaptation in the military unit as the next stage of training. Let’s say that during this period it turns out that the mobilized person has a great knack for working with UAVs, so he undergoes additional training – another 45 days. In total, we have 110 days until the moment when a person can start working directly on the positions. Isn’t that too long for the current phase of the war?
Can this be changed? I’m sure it is. To do this, you need to review the approach to learning and a number of key points of the program and take 6 steps.
1. Start with a person, not a template Before starting training, conduct testing of physical capabilities, psychological state, identify abilities and professional experience in civilian life.
If a person is perfectly oriented to the terrain, why make him a 3D printer operator? If you are already piloting a UAV, why waste time on the obvious? And someone already knows 3D modeling programs well. Someone is a leader by nature, and someone is a quiet person who will make an ideal operator, but will never be a stormtrooper.
Emphasis on what a person has a knack for, but taking into account his physical and psychological characteristics – all this will allow to ensure the next step – to make corrections in the time frame of preparation. If we ignore individuality, we lose months and demotivate people.
2. Shorten the “universal” part and increase the professional part It is necessary to review the time of BZVP. Now we spend 51 days of basic training so that a person receives the military registration specialty “shooter”, and then they are sent for professional training. It’s like teaching a person to drive a car, and then separately teach them to turn on the headlights. It is logical to combine these processes: the basic training should be reduced, and the remaining time should be spent on special (anti-UAV, survival) and professional training. From my experience, I will say: if a person has abilities and flair, then after 10 days of training at the training ground, he was already introduced to the crew of the UAV.
There is a reserve for freeing up time – just look at the logic of the program. For example, fire training involves 137 hours of practice and the use of 942 rounds. That is, approximately 7 cartridges per hour – this amount can be shot in 7-10 seconds, and what to do the rest of this hour? Increasing the number of cartridges from 340 to 942, as provided by the updated program, is a good idea. But the time during which these cartridges are fired can be significantly reduced.
3. Update the program and add what is really needed in the war What I liked about the updated BZVP program is an innovation such as a course on survival in extreme conditions. Especially if it is taught qualitatively by practitioners who have tested everything on their own experience.
But the war of 2024-2025 is not only about survival. These are technologies. By optimizing the training time, it is possible to implement additional courses that are not currently available: explosive engineering, radio engineering to understand the operation of WEBs, a course on interacting with your UAVs to be able to distinguish between your own and others and understand the signs they give. These are not “chips” – this is a matter of life.
4. Strengthen training capabilities For example, a course on countering FPV drones. Try to hit an FPV flying at 120 km/h. In the program, 8 cartridges are allocated for this (previously there were four in total). In my opinion, for a person to really understand how it is done for the first time, at least 100 rounds are needed.
Or using the Lasertag system to simulate a fight: it does not always work correctly and the person who was hit may not even feel it. Paintball is better suited for such training, where every bruise after a hit activates attention.
5. Motivation = financial security Currently, during the BZVP, the amount of monetary support is UAH 20,130. Let’s be honest – this is not enough. A person should understand that even in the process of studying, he receives more than the average salary in the region. But! Only if there are no violations. If they are, the salary is lower.
6. Evaluate not only the process, but also the suitability It is necessary to change the principle of evaluation of learning outcomes. It is good that in the updated program they are mandatory. But currently, the results are tallied according to NATO standards – the weak and strong sides of the processes are discussed. But there is a more important question: can a person do the job in the real conditions of war? Not everyone is able to overcome fear. But everyone can be useful. Perhaps a person will bring more benefit d is in stock and will also do the job. And I have many such examples in my combat experience.
And as a conclusion. We can continue to increase the number of mobilized for a long time. We can perfectly distribute them between teams. But until we learn to teach effectively, if we do not begin to competently and quickly reveal the potential of each person, we will continue to hammer nails with an iPhone.
And war does not forgive the wrong tool.
And even more so – the wrong use of a person.
Andriy Ivanov (“Prosecutor”)commander of the military unit of the 17th Army Corps
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