Neither the Russian security forces nor Putin are interested in negotiations in the near future – ISW on insiders from the elites of the Russian Federation

This is the conclusion drawn by analysts of the Institute for the Study of War from insiders published by Medusa on January 9.

In particular, as ISW points out, Medusa’s material suggests that Russian security forces and the military may recognize that the Russian army is not making significant territorial gains commensurate with the losses of manpower and equipment that the Russians are experiencing in Ukraine. Until now, the Russian command put up with excessive losses of personnel in exchange for tactical gains (but not operational achievements on the battlefield), remind in ISW. So “Putin’s theory of victory, at least until now, has been based on accepting such losses as long as Russian troops continue to advance in Ukraine, ISW experts remind.

They add that in December 2024, the average daily advance of Russians into Ukraine slowed down by about 9 sq. km — after the Russian army increased both territorial gains and personnel losses for three months in a row (in September, October and November 2024). However, the Russian military command may be less prepared than Putin for such high casualties if the pace of Russian troop advances continues to slow, the ISW report said.

At the same time, judging by Medusa’s data, Russian officials in the special services and armed forces of the Russian Federation are not ready to end the war due to these losses. As reported in the insiders of the Russian publication, instead “high-ranking security forces” are in favor of Putin stepping up military efforts, calling for mobilization and a “full transition to military rails” – probably in hopes of filling the battlefield with Russian manpower and equipment, the ISW states.

The Institute for the Study of War continues to assess that Putin opposes an official partial mobilization of reservists or further mobilization of the Russian economy, as such decisions would be highly unpopular with Russians and would further strain the Russian labor market and economy. So it remains unclear whether this group of Russian security and military officials, who are calling for further mobilization of manpower and economy, will succeed in persuading Putin to take more radical measures to meet the needs of the Russian military in Ukraine, notes ISW. At the same time, they assume that increasing personnel losses and increasing problems in achieving the goals of hidden “voluntary” mobilization may force Putin to conduct a partial draft of reservists in the near future.

ISW analysts also add that judging by this position of the highest Russian power circles, they most likely consider the lack of manpower to be Russia’s biggest obstacle to achieving rapid success on the battlefield (rather than the ineffectiveness of the troops, the poor abilities of Russian commanders in planning campaigns and the significant lack of armored vehicles that the occupiers are currently experiencing). However the main factor currently causing Russia’s relatively slow pace of advance on the battlefield remains, in fact, not a lack of manpower, but the inability of the occupying forces to resume maneuver warfare, emphasized in ISW.

Russian forces have recently demonstrated that they are capable of making slow, difficult advances in infantry assaults on the Pokrovsky and Kurakhiv directions. But their inability to carry out fast mechanized maneuvers did not allow the invaders to turn these tactical conquests into deep penetration into the Ukrainian rear [оперативного рівня]remind in ISW.

Analysts state that it is necessary to resume the war of maneuver on the battlefield, which is becoming more and more “transparent” due to the action of UAVs, while both Russian and Ukrainian forces are trying in vain. However, the Russian military will have to eliminate not only this problem, but also “critical deficiencies in its ability to train commanders for the front and plan military operations.”

So, summarizing in ISW, the Medusa report suggests that the Russian security elite, like Putin himself, have no interest in resolving the war in the near future through peaceful negotiations. The article mentions that Russian elites are particularly focused on creation “image of victory” in post-war Russia. ISW believes that this focus is coupled with the desire of the elites to intensify the war “further indicates that Russian elites support Putin’s desire to negotiate only on terms dictated by Russia and achieve a significant victory to justify the war to Russian society.” Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials have repeatedly indicated that Russia is unwilling to participate in honest and meaningful peace talks — except under conditions that are tantamount to Ukraine’s full surrender, ISW points out. Therefore, the Russian elite will most likely continue to support Putin’s demands regarding the participation of the Russian Federation in such negotiations.