“The answer to the main question. When and under what conditions will Putin use nuclear weapons, American scientist October 19, 18:15 NV Premium Share: Maryana Budzherin: Fears of nuclear escalation remain real (Photo: Facebook) Author: Maryana Budzherin Researcher in the field of nuclear disarmament Mar Yana Budzherin, in her article for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, considers the possibility of nuclear escalation during the Russian-Ukrainian war War in Russia”, — write on: ua.news
Maryana Budzherin: Fears of nuclear escalation remain real (Photo: Facebook)
Researcher in the field of nuclear disarmament Mariana Budzherin in his material for The bulletin of the atomic scientists ponders the possibility of nuclear escalation during the Russian-Ukrainian war
Russia’s war against Ukraine is an ordinary conflict. But this is in many respects also a nuclear crisis.
Aggressor Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, including a huge stockpile of combat nuclear weapons. Since the beginning of the war, the Kremlin has relied heavily on nuclear threats and signals to intimidate the West and prevent military aid to Ukraine, with some, albeit limited, success.
The latest example of Russian nuclear rhetoric is the changes in nuclear doctrine recently announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin. They expand the allowable scenarios for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons and add ambiguity and room for interpretation, allowing the Russian leadership to determine whether and when such scenarios will occur.
Although Russia uses nuclear rhetoric for political purposes, there is a constant danger that it could resort to the actual use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
From the early days of the invasion, there was—and still is—an established view that the most likely scenario for Russia’s use of limited nuclear weapons is a reversal of Ukraine’s future military defeat, or perhaps a breakthrough and exit from a painful stalemate.
For Russia, which won the war in Europe, condemnation from China is not so important
The nuclear panic of October 2022 seems to confirm the suggestion that Russia may resort to nuclear weapons if forced to retreat. When Ukraine was rapidly liberating the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, the Russian military-political leadership was allegedly considering the possibility of using nuclear weapons to disrupt Ukrainian successes. In public, Russia invented a false accusation that Ukraine plans to use “dirty bomb,” and many feared that it was creating a pretext for a Russian nuclear strike. The American intelligence community has estimated the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons in the fall of 2022 at 50 percent, possibly a historical high.
But has the international community overlooked another scenario — a situation in which the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is not only possible, but even more probable? What if Russia goes nuclear not when it loses the war, but when it starts to win?
Nuclear calculations, then and now. Much remains to be known about how Russia reasoned two years ago, and what ultimately helped dissuade it from using nuclear weapons. It was probably some combination of US threats that the consequences for Russia could be catastrophic, including conventional strikes on Russian military facilities in occupied Ukrainian territory, plus the intervention of China, which could promise to increase military aid with conventional weapons, and the dubious the military benefit of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
The use of nuclear weapons, which Russia considered in the fall of 2022, would be outside the scope of Russian nuclear doctrine both before and after the announced changes. This reality points to the limited deterrence that the declaratory doctrine is likely to impose on considering the use of nuclear weapons in war.
Fears of nuclear escalation remain real, and Ukraine’s Western partners continue to carefully consider escalation dynamics when making decisions about what weapons systems to provide to Ukraine and how to authorize their end-use. An example is the current reluctance to allow Ukraine to strike Russian territory with Western-supplied weapons. At the heart of this is the assumption that Ukraine cannot be too defiant in its resistance, so as not to provoke the nuclear wrath of Russia.
But what are the nuclear risks of the opposite scenario — when the dynamics of conventional hostilities in Ukraine will decisively shift in favor of Russia?
Consider that so far the only use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict has been by a nuclear power that was on the way to victory. The United States decided to drop two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, when Japan was almost defeated by conventional means of warfare but stubbornly refused to end its resistance and accept the US surrender terms.
Although the reasons and justifications for the US decision to use nuclear weapons on Japan are still a matter of debate among historians, it is safe to say that the bombings achieved at least three goals. They ended the war with Japan sooner, perhaps sparing the United States the need for a costly invasion of its own islands. They allowed the United States to impose the terms of an end to the war and a postwar settlement—that is, the unconditional surrender of Japan and its military occupation by the United States. And finally, they made a strong impression on the Soviet Union.
Although historical precedents should not be applied uncritically in time and context, they can be used for understanding. The set of incentives prompting Russia to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of victory in Ukraine would not differ from those that prompted the US to decide in 1945. Perhaps Putin’s reference to the precedents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in his speech in September 2022 was not just a cliché.
A victorious Russia may indeed have more to gain and less to lose from a nuclear strike than a retreating Russia.
A nuclear scenario is possible if Russia wins.
Imagine Russia breaking through Ukraine’s defensive lines and steadily advancing on persistent, if hopeless, pockets of Ukrainian resistance—a scenario that today looks far more likely than a sudden expulsion of Russian troops from Ukraine.
When victory is close, but not yet in the hands of Russia, it would be very tempting for it to launch a missile with a nuclear warhead on a secondary Ukrainian city and demand immediate and unconditional surrender from Ukraine, otherwise the next victim will be another city, already a big one.
Continued resistance on the part of Kyiv would suddenly become imprudent, if not suicidal. Under such a scenario, the Kremlin could end the war faster, with fewer losses and on favorable terms for Russia. He could impose on Ukraine unconditional surrender, occupation and other onerous conditions, which it would consider itself entitled to count on after a long and expensive war. The prospect of ruling over the red-hot radioactive ruins would hardly be an obstacle for Russia. The senseless destruction of Mariupol, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Maryinka and other Ukrainian cities by Russian artillery and bombs before Russia occupied them resembles what can be achieved with a single non-strategic nuclear missile, minus the effectiveness and radioactivity. After all, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were rebuilt in just a few years and today are quite livable.
Russia is likely to incur international political costs for breaking the eight-decade-old nuclear weapons taboo, but those costs may be better mitigated by a victorious Russia than a defeated one. The United States and its NATO allies may not follow through on their threat to spend heavily militarily in response to a Russian nuclear strike if Ukraine is seen as the loser. For Russia, which won the war in Europe, condemnation from China is not so important. Finally, Russia’s use of nuclear weapons will impress NATO capitals and allow it to shape a broader postwar settlement in Europe in its own interests.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, their use remains possible. In times of crisis and conflict, its use becomes more likely. The Kremlin’s active use of nuclear rhetoric for political coercion since February 2022 should not obscure the very real danger that Russia could launch an actual nuclear strike on the battlefield in Ukraine. Western capitals, balancing between support for Ukraine and fears of nuclear escalation, should remember that if Russia is allowed to achieve a significant military advantage in Ukraine, the risk of using nuclear weapons may turn out to be higher than if Russia retreats.
NV translation
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