“The Russians broke through to the outskirts of Vugledar. What is the risk of its encirclement and what will it mean to capture the city, which has been a fortress of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for years — ISW September 25, 09:10 Share: Footage of Russian strikes on Vugledar (Photo: Deep State / 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) During the last few days, troops The Russian Federation entered the eastern region of Vugledar and probably took the C-051134 Vugledar-Bogoyavlenka route under fire control. This road can”, — write on: ua.news
Footage of Russian strikes on Ugledar (Photo: Deep State / 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces)
During the last few days, Russian troops entered the eastern region of Vugledar and probably took the C-051134 Vugledar-Bogoyavlenka road under fire control. This road may be the last way to connect the garrison of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Vugledar, which is threatened by the encirclement.
This is stated in the new summary of the Institute for the Study of War.
ISW analysts state that Russian troops reached the outskirts of Vugledar after intensified offensives in the area of the city, however, the hypothetical capture of Vugledar is unlikely to provide the Russian army with any particular operational advantage for further offensive operations in the western part of Donetsk region.
Footage with confirmed geolocation, published on September 24, shows that Russian troops have advanced to the eastern part of Vugledar to 13-ty Desantnikiv Street. This confirms reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources that Russian troops broke into the eastern district of Vugledar between September 23 and 24. ISW specialists remind that Russian troops are additionally trying to advance on the northeastern flank of Vugledar through Watery and on the southwestern flank through Purificationprobably trying to surround the Ukrainian group in Vugledar and make him leave.
The Institute for the Study of War also confirmed the geolocation of footage released on September 24, which further indicates that Russian forces (probably assault units of the 29th Combined Arms Army Eastern Military District) was capturedSouth Donbas mine No. 3 in the western part of Vodyanyi, which creates a sharper protrusion of the occupation forces approximately five kilometers north of Vugledar in the area west of Vodyanyi.
Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces were maintaining fire control (i.e., able to conduct artillery fire from close range to impede movement) over the road C-051134 Vugledar-Bogoyavlenka — which, as reported, is allegedly the last supply route for the forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Vugledar. On September 23 and 24, Western media and Ukrainian military experts and journalists widely warned that continuous Russian attacks and an offensive on the flanks of Vugledar threatened to encircle the Ukrainian garrison within the settlement, which could force Ukrainian troops to retreat from this area, which for more than two years had been an important fortress Ukrainian forces.
The Institute for the Study of War suggests that Russian troops can really manage to capture all of Ugledar. However, how quickly or easily they can do so will likely depend, at least in part, on the decisions Ukraine makes. If the Ukrainian command decides that the risk of a Russian encirclement of Vugledar or the cost of defending the settlement itself in urban fighting is too great, Ukrainian forces can withdraw, allowing Russian forces to capture Vugledar relatively quickly and without engaging in close combat. On the other hand, Ukrainian forces may choose to defend Vugledar and prevent Russian attempts to capture or encircle it. Then the battles for the settlement, the positions in which the Ukrainian forces have been strengthening for more than two years, may become a challenge for the Russians.
If the occupiers fail to capture Vugledar relatively quickly, attempted Russian maneuvering operations along the city’s flanks may also be adversely affected by the onset of autumn rains. This would greatly complicate the advance of Russian troops through the mostly rural and agricultural area around Vugledar. Even Russian “militants” have recognized that Ukrainian fortifications in Vugledar and the terrain along its flanks are the main obstacles to Russian advances in the area – both during previous offensive efforts and during the current series of attacks.
Russia has previously made at least two major offensive attempts to capture Vugledar, notably in late 2022 and early 2023. Both of which resulted in significant Russian losses in personnel and equipment, while allowing Ukrainian forces to continue to fortify the settlement and observe the Russian group in the area planning and conducting offensive operations. Since 2022, Russia has engaged units of the Eastern Military District here, in particular the 40th Marine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet. Whereas the forces of the Armed Forces defending Vugledar during the same period probably gained some valuable experience in how these Russian formations fight.
However, even the potential seizure of Vugledar by Russia is unlikely to radically change the course of the Russian offensive operations in the west of the Donetsk region, considered in ISW. Vugledar is not a particularly important logistics hub, moreover, Russian troops already control most of the main roads passing through Vugledar (road T0509 Vugledar-Prechystivka, road C050524 Pavlivka-Vugledar and road T0524 Vugledar-Marinka). Probably, recently they are also really threatening the route C051134 in Bogoyavlenka with their fire. Therefore, the capture of Ugledar cannot be ensured Russian forces have immediate access to a new road, which they did not have before. The loss of the city by Ukraine will also not cut off Ukrainian forces from other logistical routes that would be important for their logistical support.
The potential capture of Vugledar will also not necessarily provide Russian forces with an advantageous position to launch further offensive operations in other parts of Donetsk region. Vugledar is located 23 kilometers south of the N-15 highway, which runs from the city of Donetsk to the districts on the border of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. However, the area between Vugledar and this route consists mostly of open fields, which would require Russian forces to conduct successful mechanized assaults through areas which, due to autumn weather, may soon become too unsuitable for rapid advances and tactical advances.
Vugledar is also located approximately 30 kilometers south of the southeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, the offensive on which the Russian military currently prefers. The occupiers would then have to maneuver through more than 30 km of open terrain to support the advance of their troops southeast of Pokrovsk. ISW has previously assessed that Russian offensive efforts near Vugledar and Pokrovsk are complementary and aim to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider front in Donetsk region. However, a hypothetical takeover of Ugledar by Russia will not necessarily be significant enough from an operational point of view to achieve this goal, ISW emphasizes.