“Ihor Lutsenko Military serviceman of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, commander of the UAV attack unit We have no other way out. How to solve the problem of filling the army of Ukraine September 23, 11:32 Share: Leave the dreams that we will be able to get some additional number of soldiers into the armed forces and finally win the war. Ukrainian society is not capable of this either voluntarily or forcibly. And the practice of intensive busification of the last six months shows this, and the evidence of recruiting”, — write on: ua.news
Leave the dreams that we can get some extra soldiers into the armed forces and finally win the war. Ukrainian society is not capable of this either voluntarily or forcibly
And the practice of intensive busification of the last six months shows this, and the evidence of recruiting promoted military brands proves it. The influx of new real personnel in the Armed Forces is very modest.
We have no other choice but to rely on those who are already in the army.
And now in the army, probably 80% of people were civilians in the past.
In order to find a solution to the problem of filling the army, it makes sense to give ex-civilians the opportunity to shape the personnel policy of the armed forces and establish relations with society.
Because they, these excivils, compared to professional soldiers, left their society recently and understand it much better, so they will be able to solve this problem more effectively.
Let’s honestly admit that there will be no mass demobilization after 36 months of war, because a replacement is not being prepared right now. The pace of mobilization barely competes with the level of casualties.
Therefore, among other things, it makes sense to focus on saving the human resources that are already fighting. A few examples of this attitude are below.
The pace of mobilization barely competes with the level of casualties
1. Restore legality oversight in the military. Now the soldier has no one to complain about the arbitrariness of the commanders, except to the superiors (that is, those who appointed these commanders). Therefore, there is a mass SZH.
2. Since we, the current military, will be forced to fight for at least a few more years, a system of rotation between civilian and military life should be provided for us. The model can be “3 months in the war — 1.5 in civilian life,” or “4 months of war – 2 months in civilian life” and the like. Staying in such a regime will allow families to recover and not be destroyed, and in general to partially preserve the civilian life of the military. This requires a larger influx of mobilized — but not as large as for full replacement.
3. During the war, remove the requirements for ranks for appointment to certain positions. Now, people with enormous management or professional experience have joined the army, the competence of which allows them to immediately occupy very high positions and manage thousands of people. But the current system generally does not allow them to do this. I repeat, we have 80% of yesterday’s civilians in the army. They are great fighters, so let them form their own army on their own, with their own rules and procedures. And let me remind you that all the innovations we are proud of now came about thanks to grassroots activity that did not operate according to the old Soviet military rules.
4. Make a system for evaluating commanders. It’s a NATO standard, if anything. We urgently need to get rid of inefficient commanders, because they are worse than the enemy, they cause us much more damage, they flee to the NWZ by the thousands, and die by the thousands. Assessment procedures exist in NATO, or can be borrowed from approaches currently practiced in the corporate sector for managers.
5. Speed up procedures for the execution of transfer orders, and also allow specialists to be freely transferred after a certain decent period of service in one place. This will give people a chance to develop and use themselves effectively in the war. Otherwise, it is a mass SZH.
6. Adopt a separate status for high-tech military branches (Forces of unmanned systems, cyber forces, rer/reb, etc.) according to the model according to which the Special Operations Forces currently have this status. These types of troops should have special mechanisms for organizing their own work and interaction with the civilian sector, as well as personnel policy. It is not possible to organize units of aitishniks according to the patterns of cavalry battalions of the 19th century, as is happening now.
In short, the army should cease to exist “a prison for heroes,” according to the apt expression of one of the fighters.
The text is published with the permission of the author
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